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ABSTRACT
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) will transform many aspects of
traditional telephony service, including the technology, the business models,
and the regulatory constructs that govern such service. Perhaps not
unexpectedly, this transformation is generating a host of technical, business,
social, and policy problems. In attempting to respond to these problems, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) could mandate obligations or
specific solutions to VoIP policy issues; however, it is instead looking first
to industry initiatives focused on the key functionality that users have come
to expect of telecommunications services. High among this list of desired
functionality is user access to emergency services for purposes of
summoning fire, medical, and law enforcement agencies. Such services
were traditionally required to be implemented (and subsequently were
implemented) through state and federal regulations.
An emergency service capability is a critical social concern, making
it particularly important for the industry to propose viable solutions for
promoting VoIP emergency services before regulators are compelled to
mandate a solution. Reproducing emergency services in the VoIP space has
proven to be a considerable task, mainly due to the wide and diverse variety
of VoIP implementations and implementers. While technical and business
communities have, in fact, made considerable progress in this area,
significant uncertainty and deployment problems still exist.
The question we ask is this: Can an industry-based certification and
labeling process credibly address social and policy expectations regarding
emergency services and VoIP, thus avoiding the need for government
regulation at this critical time?1 We hypothesize that the answer is “yes.”
In answering this question, we developed a model for VoIP emergency
service compliance through industry certification and device labeling. This
model is intended to support a wide range of emergency service
implementations while providing users with sufficient verification that the
service will operate as anticipated. To this end, we first examine possible
technical implementations for VoIP emergency services.2 Next, we
summarize the theory of certification as self-regulation and examine several
relevant examples. Finally, we synthesize a specific model for certification
1

We would like to acknowledge and thank the NET Institute (http://www.NETinst.org) for supporting this
project.
2
Note that we use the term “emergency services” for VoIP rather than specifying it as E911 for VoIP. We
make this distinction in order to distinguish between the technology of traditional emergency services carried over
the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) versus those services carried over IP and to emphasize that
emergency services in the IP space might be very different from traditional E911 in terms of function.
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of VoIP emergency services. We believe that the model we describe
provides both short-term and long-term opportunities. In the short term, an
industry-driven effort to solve the current problem of VoIP emergency
services, if properly structured and overseen as we suggest, should be both
effective and efficient. In the long term, such a process can serve as a selfregulatory model that can be applied to social policy goals in the
telecommunications industry, making it an important tool to have as the
industry becomes increasingly diverse and heterogeneous.
I. INTRODUCTION
VoIP promises to upend a century-old model of voice telephony by
creating a more dynamic marketplace and by changing the point of control
from the central office switch to the end user’s device. The transformation
to VoIP is only in its very early stages, and it will ultimately impact all
sectors of the telecommunications services industry, including traditional
incumbent local exchange carriers, cable providers, wireless service
providers, and emergency service providers. In fact, all of the relevant
stakeholders affected by VoIP (e.g., service providers, hardware and
software vendors, customers, and governmental agencies) share a great need
to analyze the issues raised by the transition from the traditional Public
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) to a packet-switched, Internet
Protocol (IP)-based architecture. For example, service providers and
hardware and software developers are struggling to understand and take
advantage of opportunities in this area involving new technology prospects
(e.g., integrated messaging and mobile collaboration). Moreover, business,
governmental, and residential consumer users of telecommunications
equipment and services are seeking guidance on when and how to upgrade
to a new technological frontier. Finally, governmental agencies are
struggling to ensure that social policy concerns will be addressed in this
very different technological environment.
The social policy implications of VoIP present regulators and
incumbent businesses with an unusual dilemma, forcing them to choose
from amongst mutually exclusive—and equally unfavorable—options.
Under the current PSTN-based voice telephone network, many critical
policy goals, such as the provision of reliable emergency services, are
implemented effectively and reliably. However, most VoIP services, at least
as they exist today, do not deliver the same level of quality and
dependability as emergency services. In response, some state regulators
have considered passing regulations requiring VoIP to meet legacy (and
other) requirements, regardless of the dramatic differences in the VoIP
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services technical and business models.3 The FCC has only begun to
develop its regulatory VoIP strategy, although former Chairman Michael
Powell had made it clear that the strategy would need to differ from the
legacy model used in the PSTN context, a position likely to continue in
successor FCC administrations.4 With these thoughts in mind, it is unclear
how VoIP services might evolve in a meaningful and timely fashion.
In a number of specific circumstances, however, self-regulation can
be a viable alternative to government regulation. Certification, in particular,
can be provided by a self-regulatory body as evidence of conformance to
required attributes, practices, or policies. Self-regulation has a number of
potential advantages, and in the case of VoIP emergency services we are
particularly interested in recognizing information asymmetries between
industry and government, given the increase in complexity and
heterogeneity inherent in the move from PSTN to VoIP. In order for selfregulation to be viewed as a credible alternative and in order for it to
ultimately succeed, it needs to be situated within a careful institutional
framework that includes (1) a clear and consistent external motivation (e.g.,
an incentive in terms of third-party liability), (2) a process for determining
the specifications to be certified, (3) identification of certifiers and
determination if a competitive market for certification exists, (4) reference
to an appropriately neutral accrediting party (a role that government can but
does not have to fill), (5) communication of certification to users, and
(6) policing of certification.
The telecommunications industry has
repeatedly demonstrated the ability to self-regulate in areas of
interoperability where economic motivation can be relied on to incentivize
the activity. In this case, though, we propose that the industry self-regulate
in order to address a social policy goal. Success in this area could even help
self-regulation become a tool that could be applied in other areas of social
policy (especially in the development of new policy initiatives that would
otherwise
be
imposed
through
government
regulation
of
telecommunications, as has traditionally been the case).
The particular technical challenges surrounding VoIP emergency
services arise from two major drivers: variability and location. VoIP can be
3
Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993 (D. Minn. 2003). Note that
newer service providers have already started to tell consumers that VoIP services may not meet traditional E911
expectations, although they have not yet described what the alternative expectations might be. For example, an
AT&T spokesperson, referring to the company’s consumer VoIP service, indicates, “We make very clear to our
customers that our CallVantage Internet phone service does not work the same as traditional landline 911.” 911
Calls Made Over Internet Often Get Lower Priority, USA TODAY, October 12, 2004, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-10-12-voip-trouble_x.htm.
4
Written statement of Michael K. Powell on Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), February 24, 2004,
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-244231A1.pdf.
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seen as a much more variable service than traditional PSTN-based
telephony, and many new business models and technical combinations are
emerging in which quality, methods of initiating and terminating calls,
integration with other messaging technologies,5 and types of terminals (e.g.,
phones, PDAs, and PCs) have all become heterogeneous. For emergency
services in particular, IP networks are fundamentally location independent,
and VoIP services may run on IP networks over many different types of
wired and wireless access.6 As a result, these realities challenge a
fundamental modern expectation—that an emergency services dispatcher
can identify the caller’s location even if the caller does not know the
location or is not able to describe it. Although substantial technical progress
is being made regarding the provision of emergency services in various
VoIP settings, users may not be able to determine prior to an emergency
whether the particular service they are employing is emergency service
capable. Accordingly, we propose to use labeling as a means of specifying
the particular level of emergency service capability provided, in recognition
of the fact that VoIP’s diversity will preclude a single common requirement
for all possible VoIP services. We also propose that an emergency service
testing capability be made available to the end user.
In this paper, we will describe the technical issues surrounding
emergency service in VoIP, examine the status of proposed technical
strategies,7 and identify candidate criteria to be used in certification.
Furthermore, we will examine the theories behind and examples of
successful certification within self-regulatory regimes, including (1) the use
of certification in product safety, (2) the use of certification in particular by
Underwriters Laboratories acting as certifying institutions, (3) ISO 9000
quality system certification, (4) interoperability certification within the
telecommunications industry through Cable Television Laboratories and
5
Indeed, we should ask to what extent social policy expectations of emergency services response to voice
communications should also apply to the many other modes of communication that are now popular or that may
become popular, such as email, instant messaging, and video telephony. Given the possible breadth of regulation
implied by such an increase in scope, we submit that the option of effective self-regulation would be even more
valuable for all of these services than for telephony emergency services alone.
6
For example, VoIP is increasingly carried over Wi-Fi wireless local access networks, and dual-mode
phones that can switch between VoIP/Wi-Fi and cellular service are now being marketed. See Corie Lok, One
Person, One Phone, TECH. REV., March 2004, available at http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/
print_version/innovation10304.asp, and Marguerite Reardon, Wi-Fi and VoIP: Is Sum Greater Than Parts,
CNET.COM, March 1, 2004, available at http://news.com.com/2102-7352_3-5167782.html.
7
VoIP has a number of different signaling frameworks, including the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and
H.323. For the most part, we attempt to proceed in a framework-independent manner in this paper; however, in
cases where the framework is relevant, we focus on the SIP framework. We fully acknowledge that development
of actual certification standards will need to consider multiple frameworks. Our emphasis on SIP is motivated by
technical, market, and policy issues that are outside the scope of this paper. See Glenn Fleishman, An Internet
Extension to Your Telephone Twin, N.Y. TIMES, August 28, 2003, at G3 (explaining in basic terms how a SIP
phone works). For a good overview of SIP, see generally the SIP Working Group homepage on the Internet
Engineering Task Force website, available at http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/sip-charter.html.
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Telcordia, (5) the Wi-Fi Alliance as a consumer-oriented certification
consortium, and (6) general experience with self-regulation in
environmental policy. In the end, we will synthesize these insights in order
to propose specific recommendations on institutional design, technical
criteria, and the certification process.
II. EXISTING MODELS FOR CERTIFICATION
In this section, we will share the results of secondary research into
existing certification processes. Drawing on historical analysis and
literature review techniques, this research incorporates the collection and
analysis of original descriptions, outcomes research on certification
processes, and research on the manner in which these processes have been
embedded in overall policy systems including government regulation. In the
end, we will offer an overall model for successful certification tailored to
the particular technical and industrial circumstances of VoIP.
A. Theory and Practice of Certification
Well-established certification processes are used in professions such
as medicine and law to accredit practitioners, in securities markets by
underwriters and auditors, and in product safety and compatibility arenas.
More recently, certification and, more broadly, self-regulation have emerged
in new social policy settings (e.g., the certification of a manufacturer’s
compliance with labor practice expectations in developing countries or with
specific environmental practices). Substantial research has created a
reasonable understanding of the purpose of certification, as well as of its
challenges and drawbacks.
Certification can have both economic and social policy goals. In
economic terms, products or services may have attributes (such as quality or
safeness) that buyers have difficulty ascertaining prior to the purchase. As a
result, consumers oftentimes cannot distinguish between products, a
situation that leaves little incentive for companies to include the attributes in
the first place. Although reputation (brand) and warranties may mitigate
this effect, such factors fall short if they are inconsistent or if customers find
it too difficult or costly to apply the factors as a recourse. Certification can
thus provide an alternate method for reliably signaling attribute
distinctions.8 For social policy, certification (as an aspect of self-regulation)
can serve as an alternative or complement to government regulation. In
8
Gian Luigi Albano & Alessandro Lizzeri, Strategic Certification and Provision of Quality, 42 INT’L ECON.
REV. 1, 267-283 (2001).
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other words, certification can be used as a means of avoiding the
overproduction of negative social externalities (e.g., pollution) and the
underproduction of positive social externalities (e.g., safety policies).
Moreover, certification can offer important advantages over direct
“command-and-control” regulation. For example, certification can reduce
the demand on government services and, consequently, on required levels of
taxation (or, put another way, certification can better accommodate a neoliberal reduced-government capability). It can also exploit information
asymmetries in which industry participants have more (and better)
information than a potential government regulator.9 The direct use of
industry information may increase the rate at which regulation can adapt as
circumstances change and may also subsequently reduce the need to
enumerate all conceivable contingencies, resulting in more flexible and
lighter-weight regulation.10 Furthermore, preemptive self-regulation may
eliminate the need for industries and their opponents to make politically
motivated investments in regulatory policies.11
Self-regulation can also have a moral and cultural effect by
inculcating an ethical component in institutional self-image that induces
behavior that exceeds mere compliance with the letter of the law.12
Conversely, imposition of rigid regulation instead of self-regulation on
sectors that have a strong anti-authoritarian tradition can, as commentator
Darren Sinclair notes, “destroy virtue in the business community.”13 We
believe that it is far too early to suggest that the telecommunications
industry is incapable of producing its own solutions.

9
Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, 87 J.
POLITICAL ECONOMY 6, 1328-1346 (1979) [hereinafter: Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing].
10
Christodoulos Stefanadis, Self-Regulation, Innovation, and the Financial Industry, 23 J. REG. ECON. 1,
5-25 (2003).
11
In this case, the end result is a Pareto improvement in welfare. See John W. Maxwell, Thomas P. Lyon, &
Steven C. Hackett, Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism,
43 J. LAW & ECON. 583 (2000) [hereinafter: Maxwell, et. al., Self-Regulation and Social Welfare]. Also see THE
ECONOMIST’S Research Tools, available at http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/, which defines
Pareto efficiency as follows:
A situation in which nobody can be made better off without making somebody else worse off.
Named after Vilfredo Pareto (1843–1923), an Italian economist. If an economy’s resources are
being used inefficiently, it ought to be possible to make somebody better off without anybody
else becoming worse off. In reality, change often produces losers as well as winners. Pareto
efficiency does not help judge whether this sort of change is economically good or bad.
12
Marius Aalders & Ton Wilthagen, Moving Beyond Command-and-Control: Reflexivity in the Regulation
of Occupational Safety and Health and the Environment, 19 LAW & POL’Y 4, 415-443 (1997), and Simon Ashby,
Swee-Hoon Chuah, & Robert Hoffmann, Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic
Voluntary Compliance, 11 INT’L J. OF THE ECONOMICS OF BUS. 1, 91-106 (2004) [hereinafter: Ashby, et. al.,
Industry Self-Regulation].
13
Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False Dichotomies, 19 LAW &
POL’Y 4, 529-559 (1997) [hereinafter: Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control].
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On the other hand, certification can have undesirable side effects
that should be anticipated in institutional design. If certifiers are under the
control of the body being certified, certification may be deliberately
structured to restrict new entrants and extract monopoly rents for already
certified parties,14 an attribute of guilds that continues in contemporary
professions that require certification.15 A parallel social policy concern
relates to the credibility of the certifier, who may be perceived as being too
tightly controlled by the certifying body.16
Ironically, though, should certification preempt some other form of
regulation and succeed in spurring innovation and even new entrants, it is
quite possible that incumbents would view the previous form of regulation
as preferable even though a broader social perspective would favor
certification. For this reason, we cannot conclude with assurance that all
industry players will prefer certification even if it benefits both industry as a
whole and society at large.
If the certification capability is limited to a single or small number
of suppliers of certifications, the certification process itself might capture
monopoly rents to the detriment of suppliers or consumers. More generally,
even a competitive certifier market can exhibit peculiarities depending on
the level of certifier liability, the regulation of the certifier market, and the
amount of competition17 (e.g., situations in which certifiers do not provide
all information or choose to provide noisy information).18 The structure of
the certifier market is consequently a non-trivial consideration.

14
Id., at 38. Leland provides a more nuanced analysis of whether licensing results in standards that are too
high in order to restrict competition: “If a professional group or industry is allowed to set minimum quality
standards (self-regulation), these standards may be set too high or too low. On balance, however, there is some
reason to expect too-high standards will be the more likely case.” Leland, Quacks, Lemons and Licensing, cited
supra at note 9, at 1342. See also Ulrike Schaede, Industry Rules: From Deregulation to Self-Regulation, 28 THE
JAPANESE ECONOMY 6, 35-58 (2000). Schaede points out a related problem in which apparent deregulation in
Japan, replaced by industry self-regulation, did little to weaken trade barriers.
15
Bernardo Bortolotti & Gianluca Fiorentini, Barriers to Entry and the Self-Regulating Professions:
Evidence from the Market for Italian Accountants, in BERNARDO BORTOLOTTI & GIANLUCA FIORENTINI, EDS.,
ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND SELF-REGULATION (OXFORD, UK: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1999), at 131-157;
and Roger Van Den Bergh, Self-Regulation of the Medical and Legal Professions: Remaining Barriers to
Competition and EC Law, IN BERNARDO BORTOLOTTI & GIANLUCA FIORENTINI, EDS., ORGANIZED INTERESTS
AND SELF-REGULATION (OXFORD, UK: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1999), at 89-130.
16
In social policy regulation, critics are quick to question the extent to which firms and industries will truly
restrict themselves, notwithstanding their stated intentions. To some extent, this debate rests on questions as to
whether firms optimize shareholder wealth or take a stakeholder perspective. See Javier Núñez, A Model of SelfRegulation, ECONOMICS LETTERS 74, 91-97 (2001), and Maxwell, et. al., Self-Regulation and Social Welfare,
cited supra at note 11, at 52.
17
Luigi Alberto Franzoni, Imperfect Competition in Certification Markets, in BERNARDO BORTOLOTTI &
GIANLUCA FIORENTINI, EDS., ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND SELF-REGULATION (Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 1999), at 158-176.
18
Id., at 37.
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The insurance industry plays a special role in certification as well,
especially since certification may signal lower insurance risks, which may
then be reflected in lower premiums. Not unexpectedly, insurers need to be
able to rely on certifiers’ independence from producers. For example,
certifiers that vigorously compete for producer business may compromise
the accuracy of certification (witness recent auditing scandals).19
Closely related to the role of insurance in certification is the role of
liability. Liability, of course, already works in partnership with regulation
when safety issues come into play, for neither liability nor regulation by
itself is generally sufficient to produce socially desirable levels of care.20
From a producer’s perspective, then, self-regulation that results in an active
compliance activity may provide protection against imputation of “intent”
to undertake unlawful acts.21 In product liability, for example, a showing of
negligence usually requires all of the following elements to exist and
requires all of the associated questions to be answered in the positive:
(1) duty (did the vendor use “reasonable care”?), (2) breach of duty (was
there unreasonable conduct involving an act or a failure to act?),
(3) foreseeability (was the problem foreseeable?), (4) proximate cause (did
the breach cause the damage?), and (5) damage (did the conduct cause
physical injury or some other loss?). A widely accepted industry
certification or a government-endorsed certification, along with a vendor’s
consistent effort in securing such certification, can aid a defense on
questions of duty and breach of duty.
A critical question in self-regulation is the appropriate role of
government. Pure self-regulation (i.e., regulation without any external
influence) is usually rejected based on the lack of evidence showing that
this mode naturally arises or is effective.22 Conversely, a broad correlation
between evidence of governmental incentives for the creation of selfregulation and self-regulatory activity23 seems to suggest that successful and
credible self-regulation is consistently coupled with some form of influence
19
As another example, periodic softness in the market for maritime insurance leads to lax responses to
negative certification signals from insurers. See Frank Furger, Accountability and Systems of Self-Governance:
The Case of the Maritime Industry, 19 LAW & POL’Y 4, 445-476 (1997).
20
Steven Shavell, A Model for the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 RAND J. ECON. 2, at
271-280 (Summer 1984).
21
See also John C. Ruhnka & Heidi Boerstler, Governmental Incentives for Corporate Self-Regulation, 17 J.
BUS. ETHICS (1998), 1309-326 (1998) [hereinafter: Ruhnka & Boerstler, Governmental Incentives] (analogizing
self-regulation to certain consequences that can be found in criminal antitrust cases).
22
Id., at 41-42, 45. See also Jorge Rivera & Peter de Leon, Is Greener Whiter? Voluntary Environmental
Performance of Western Ski Areas, 32 THE POL’Y STUDIES J. 3. 417-437 (2004) (noting that, absent oversight, a
firm that joins a self-regulatory body may actually have a tendency to underperform when compared with firms
that do not join, thus effectively deriving membership benefits without actually investing in the area subject to
self-regulation).
23
Id., at 51.

3-May-05]

E911: A CERTIFICATION PROPOSAL

11

or oversight, leading to a model that might be described as co-regulation.24
Such external influences may come from government entities or, as is
apparent in certain contemporary social policy cases, independent nongovernmental organizations with political influence or influence over
consumer choice.25 When influencing the formation of self-regulatory
bodies, the government’s manner of signaling its intentions can be
important. In fact, game theory suggests that the government should firmly
demonstrate zero tolerance of undesirable behavior and immediately invoke
direct regulation if such behavior is observed.26 On a more positive note,
the government can also encourage self-regulation through a variety of
positive signals regarding preferential treatment for diligent selfregulators.27
Three processes that are commonly present in social regulation are
also potentially applicable to co-regulation. These three processes are as
follows: (1) prior approval, in which firms obtain approval before engaging
in an activity; (2) mandatory standards, in which firms are required to
comply with the regulation and undergo monitoring; and (3) information
disclosure, in which firms are required to disclose facts to buyers that they
might not otherwise choose to disclose.28 Interestingly, the framework by
which self-regulation is invoked can also result in unanticipated effects. For
24
Id., at 54. As Sinclair points out, the tendency in some of the literature to paint command-and-control
regulation and self-regulation as stark and distinct alternatives is overly restrictive: “Those who are locked into a
paradigm which incorrectly assumes that choices have to be made between artificially restrictive models of selfregulation and command and control regulation are unlikely to be capable of appreciating the more nuanced
opportunities for achieving both efficiency and effectiveness, which arise from complementary combination of
both types of instruments.” Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control, cited supra at note 13, at 532.
Sinclair goes on to list the following four key components, which can be modulated to select a policy on the
spectrum between command and control and self-regulation (these components are quoted verbatim) (emphasis in
the original):
the nature and extent of regulatory compulsion;
the extent to which regulatory flexibility allows firms to accommodate their individual
circumstances;
the opportunity for industry design input into the negotiation and development of regulation; and
the extent to which win-win outcomes are the focus of regulation.
The legal and regulatory incentives used to influence self-regulation have traditionally been (and often continue to
be) primarily “punitive” in nature, though some more recent cases are shifting towards positive incentives that
reward corporations for actions that encourage or assist desirable behavior. See Ruhnka & Boerstler,
Governmental Incentives, cited supra at note 21.
25
Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards and
Monitoring, 31 THE POL’Y STUDIES J. 1, 1-28 (2003), and Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests and Factories: States,
Social Movements, and the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Fields, 31 POLITICS &
SOCIETY 3, 433-464 (September 2003).
26
See Ashby, et. al., Industry Self-Regulation, cited supra at note 12.
27
Ruhnka & Boerstler give as examples recognition of compliance with self-regulation as a mitigating factor
for corporate regulatory violations by regulating agencies, by state and federal prosecutors, and in jury
instructions and sentencing guidelines; recognition of self-reporting as a mitigating factor by prosecutors and
regulators; and substitution of internal compliance for agency monitoring. Ruhnka & Boerstler, Governmental
Incentives, cited supra at note 21.
28
A. Ogus, Regulatory Institutions and Structures, 73 ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS,
4, 627-648 (2002).
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example, a government-crafted “voluntary agreement” may reduce industry
efforts to engage in industry-devised self-regulatory activities, reducing
profits and, thus, general welfare.29 This point again suggests that
government should apply credible pressure in order to motivate selfregulatory activity, while also exploiting the potential advantages of selfregulation, particularly information asymmetries between industry and
government.
On a related note, another necessary element for the industrial selfregulatory component is coherent industry representation.30 Possibilities
include standards bodies, industry associations, and the consortia
increasingly evident in the information and communication technology
industries, although care must be taken, especially in the latter case, to
mitigate the potential for exclusion and reduced competition.31
On a final note, software, an increasingly important product and
component, differs greatly from many of the other types of products that
have traditionally been certified.32 Because software can directly affect
safety, software reliability is increasingly scrutinized. Certification thus can
serve the dual economic purposes of signaling quality to users and reducing
the liability of producers.33 Software often has an iterative and incremental
design character, so delaying certification testing until the completion of
software implementation can be quite inefficient.
Consequently,
certification testing is better introduced as an integral part of the internal
and regression-testing stages of software design.34 Interestingly, an
organization that embeds certification testing throughout the design cycle
can inculcate a culture in which the criteria used for certification become
implicit organizational values (e.g., by embedding security certification
testing, an organization can help foster a “security culture”).35 However,
implementation of broad software certification processes poses significant
challenges. For instance, an organization may find it infeasible to maintain
29
Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, Self-Regulation, Taxation, and Public Voluntary Environmental
Agreements, 87 J. PUBLIC ECON, 1453-1486 (2003).
30
Id., at 42.
31
Richard Hawkins, The Rise of Consortia in the Information and Communication Technology Industries:
Emerging Implications for Policy, 23 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY (1999), at 159-173.
32
It is worth noting that software has been subject to certification in a number of areas, including most
notably in the area of security. The US government developed a set of security certification techniques referred to
as the Orange Book.
33
It should be noted that producers of software already have a history of limiting liability through the terms
of software licenses. In light of this fact, some advocate an insurance-industry-driven certification regime akin to
Underwriters Laboratory-style safety certification. Harold W. Lawson, Infrastructure Risk Reduction, 41
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 6, June 1998, at 120.
34
Patricia Rodriguez-Dapena, Software Safety Certification: A Multidomain Problem, IEEE SOFTWARE,
July-August 1999, at 31-38.
35
Greg Goth, Will the Cyber-UL Concept Take Hold? IEEE SOFTWARE, July/August 2002, at 12-15.
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adequate criteria to certify products that change rapidly in function and
capability. In such cases, certification may be practical only if it is
restricted to aspects of the system that undergo fewer changes and that can
be reasonably isolated. Moreover, different types of certification give rise
to different challenges. Bruce Schneier, founder of Counterpane Internet
Security, Inc., a managed security company in San Jose, California, points
out that certifying for security—where threats are active, intelligent, and
hostile—is more challenging than certifying for safety—where threats are
usually passive and random.36
B. Certification Examples
1. Underwriters Laboratories and Product Safety Certification
Underwriters Laboratories (UL), incorporated as a non-profit
organization in 1901, was initially funded by the National Board of Fire
Underwriters to prepare lists of safe products, thus demonstrating the
potential benefits derived from linking certification to insurance.37 When
insurance industry funding ceased in 1916, UL became a self-sustaining
organization through the collection of testing fees. Today, manufacturers
are motivated to seek UL certification because (1) some customers require
it, (2) many consumers recognize it as an indicator of product safety, and
(3) it can reduce manufacturer liability by supporting reasonable care
claims.
Safety co-regulation by government agencies and an industry
certifier—Underwriters Laboratories—is apparent in two distinct models.
On the one hand, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) sanctions Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories through an
explicit accreditation process.38 (Whereas UL was originally the only such
lab, now it is but one of several.)39 OSHA regulations thus compel
manufacturers to produce and buy certified products from accredited
36

Scott Berinato, A UL-Type Seal for Security? Don’t Bet on It, EWEEK, October 16, 2000, at 11-12.
For a brief but interesting history of Underwriters Laboratories, see Harry Chase Brearly, A Symbol of
Safety: The Origins of Underwriters Laboratories, in DANIEL B. KLEIN, ED., REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE
VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT (ANN ARBOR, MI: THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS, 1997),
at 75-84.
38
Accreditation fees for test laboratories are on the order of $10,000. See U.S. Department of Labor,
Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories; Fees; Reduction of Public Comment Period on Recognition Notices,
Federal Register Number 64:45098-45114, August 18, 1999, available at http://tinyurl.com/3nl4o.
39
OSHA’s decision in 1988 to create a competitive market for testing could not be the result of a strict profit
motive on the part of UL, because UL is a non-profit organization. However, absent the discipline of competition,
even a non-profit organization may not evolve or diligently pursue efficiency initiatives. Current UL management
is undertaking a major effort to modernize and increase efficiency in the organization. See the 2003 UL Annual
Report, Underwriters Laboratory website, available at http://www.ul.com/info/UL_AR_2003.pdf. See also Brett
Nelson, Under Fire, FORBES, June 21, 2004.
37
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laboratories. The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC),40 on the
other hand, has a less formal relationship with UL. The CPSC actively
contributes to the content of UL standards in cases where the CPSC has a
direct interest.41 In other cases, the CPSC may use public feedback as a
mechanism for influencing UL practices.42 UL, for its part, actively invests
in the government and regulator services it offers. For example, UL makes
its information and consulting services available only to regulators.43
2. Telecommunications Certification: CableLabs and Telcordia
Historically, most U.S. social policy goals have been advanced
through governmental regulation rather than through self- or co-regulation.
In fact, for decades antitrust laws in the United States have provided a
significant deterrent to industry development of common standards.
European and other international companies, on the other hand, have a
long-standing tradition of working together to form common solutions. In
1984, Congress passed the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) in
recognition of the fact that U.S. industry can benefit through participation in
collaborative
standards-setting
activities.44
Accordingly,
the
telecommunications industry has only a very recent history of group
40

See the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission website, available at http://www.cpsc.gov.
The CPSC also participates in defining standards of other “voluntary” safety standards-setting
organizations, such as ASTM International (http://www.astm.org). Further, the CPSC has the authority to directly
regulate in cases where it sees sufficient safety risk by “issuing and enforcing mandatory standards or banning
consumer products if no feasible standard would adequately protect the public.” Id.
42
Underwriters Laboratories Has Been Coming Under Fire, CONSUMERS RESEARCH, January 2000, at
40-41.
43
See
Regulatory
Authorities,
Underwriters
Laboratories
website,
available
at
http://www.ul.com/regulators/.
44
S. REP. NO. 98-427 (1984). The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat.
1815 (cited in 15 U.S.C. 4301), related to research and development joint ventures. In 1993, the law was
rewritten to include production joint ventures in addition to research. National Cooperative Production
Amendments of 1993, pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat. 117 (1993):
§ 2 COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION: CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENT
OF FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
(a) FINDINGS - The Congress finds that (1) technological innovation and its profitable commercialization are critical components of the
ability of the United States to raise the living standards of Americans and to compete in world markets.
(2) cooperative arrangements among nonaffiliated businesses in the private sector are often
essential for successful technological innovation; and procompetitive cooperative innovation
arrangements, and so clarification serves a useful purpose in helping to promote such arrangements;
and
(3) the antitrust laws have been mistakenly perceived to inhibit procompetitive cooperative
innovation arrangements, and so clarification serves a useful purpose in helping to promote such
arrangements.
(b) Purpose - It is the purpose of this Act … to promote innovation, facilitate trade, and
strengthen the competitiveness of the United States in world markets by clarifying the applicability of
the rule of reason standard and establishing a procedure under which businesses may notify the
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission of their cooperative ventures and thereby qualify
for a single-damages limitation on civil antitrust liability.
15 U.S.C. 4301 (1994).
41
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certification for equipment interoperability purposes.45 This form of
certification most directly addresses the economic motivation for
certification—interoperability—which is an attribute that is both valued by
buyers and difficult for them to ascertain prior to product purchase.
Cable Television Laboratories (CableLabs), a non-profit research
consortium founded in 1988, was formed not long after the passage of the
NCRA. Funded and controlled by cable operators (generally called
multiple system operators, or MSOs) in the cable television industry,
CableLabs leads the development of cable television standards, as well as
provides certification and qualification testing for those standards.46
Equipment vendors tend to ensure their designs meet CableLabs standards,
and they tend to seek CableLabs certification, mainly because many MSOs
require certification when making equipment purchases. MSOs, in turn, are
motivated to seek out certified vendors in order to increase the supply of
interoperable equipment, which makes the equipment more of a commodity
(an effect observable in cable modem pricing) and promotes standardization
of system design and performance. Testing is performed at CableLabs, and
vendors are charged fees that range from $50,000 to $115,000 per product
tested, depending on the standard to which conformance is being certified.
Telcordia Technologies, a subsidiary of Science Applications
International Corporation (SAIC), is a descendant of Bell Laboratories by
way of Bellcore.47 The company has traditionally supplied standards
setting, certification,48 and other services to the Regional Bell operating
companies, as well as to other telephone companies and their equipment
suppliers. As is the case with the cable industry, telephony industry
equipment suppliers pay for qualification testing so that they can meet the
certification requirements of telephone operators. Among other areas of
proficiency, Telcordia inherited unique expertise in certifying the
interoperability of products with Bell company operations and management
databases.
In recent years, Telcordia and the company’s proprietary OSMINE
(Operations Systems Modifications for the Integration of Network
Elements) process have engendered sharp criticism due to the high cost of
45

Tim McElligot, Six Degrees of Preparation, TELEPHONY, October 16, 2000, at 48-60.
CableLabs standards include the Data Over Cable Services Interface Specification (DOCSIS) for cable
modems and the CableHome and PacketCable specifications. See the CableLabs website, available at
http://www.cablelabs.com/certqual/.
47
Bellcore was established from parts of Bell Labs during the AT&T divestiture in 1984, and SAIC bought
the organization in late 1998. Bill Pitterman, Telcordia Technologies: The Journey to High Maturity, 17 IEEE
SOFTWARE 4, August 2000, at 89-96 [hereinafter: Pitterman, Telcordia Technologies].
48
See Testing Services, the Telcordia website, available at http://www.telcordia.com/services/
testing/ntwk_integrity.html.
46
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testing (as much as $2M per product) and the long duration of test cycles.49
As a result, the largest Regional Bell operating company, Verizon, created
its own accreditation program, and ten labs, including Telcordia’s lab, are
currently accredited to certify compliance against standards important to
Verizon.50 In this case, a large firm (rather than the government) has made
an investment in an attempt to create a competitive market for
interoperability-oriented certification testing. Moreover, Telcordia now has
to compete for certification business. Accordingly, Telcordia’s business
strategy has shifted away from providing sole-source research and
certification (as was the case in the Bellcore era and as is similar to the case
with CableLabs)51 towards providing a broad array of services and
technologies.
3. Meta-Standard Certification: ISO 9000
Nations may identify accrediting bodies that in turn accredit
certification bodies.52 Not surprisingly, the details of quality systems can
vary dramatically depending on the product being manufactured or the
service being provided. Meta-standard certification, then, is an attempt to
provide useful certification across a very diverse and heterogeneous set of
circumstances by focusing on process clarity rather than specific outcomes.
One management practice meta-standard is the International Standards
Organization ISO 9000 series of standards, which prescribes quality
systems and their documentation and management (typically for
manufacturers, although the series has been applied to service providers as
well).53 A firm seeking certification creates and documents a quality system
that is both specific to its own activities and in conformance with ISO 9000
series principles. An ISO 9000 certification body (typically a commercial
firm offering auditing, certification, and consulting) then audits the firm to
verify system conformance with the standard and with system
documentation.
49

Dan O’Shea, A Certified Mess, TELEPHONY, January 21, 2002, at 32-39.
See the Verizon Independent Testing Laboratories Network Equipment Building System (NEBS) Testing
Certification Program (NEBS-TCP) website, available at http://www.verizonnebs.com/tcppage.html.
51
The transition of Bellcore from a consortium to a supplier was partly due to increasing competition
between the consortium’s member Regional Bell operating companies. Such competition undermines the viability
of consortia. See Pitterman, Telcordia Technologies, cited supra at note 47.
52
In the United States, three bodies are designated as accrediting bodies: the American National
Accreditation Program for Registrars of Quality Systems, the American National Standards Institute, and the
Registrar Accreditation Board.
See http://www.iso.ch/iso/en/info/ISODirectory/Country/country_US.html.
National accrediting bodies may themselves be accredited by a common international organization such as the
International Accreditation Forum. See the International Accreditation Forum website, available at
http://www.iaf.nu/. Note that ISO itself does not accredit any organization relative to accreditation or
certification.
53
Mustafa V. Uzumeri, ISO 9000 and Other Metastandards: Principles for Management Practice? 11
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT EXECUTIVES 1, 21-36 (1997).
50
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Companies adopt ISO 9000 for the following reasons, which appear
in descending order: to meet customer certification requirements
(particularly those of public sector customers), to reduce the possibility of
product liability, and to increase the utility of quality improvement
programs in general (consistent with the theme, broadly developed in the
mid-1980s through the mid-1990s, that quality improvement increases a
firm’s profitability).54 ISO 9000 certification has grown into its own
industry, one that employs numerous consultants, trainers, auditors, and
registrars.
As became apparent by the late 1990s, however, the correlation
between ISO 9000 certification and product quality is weaker than could be
hoped. Task forces in the UK evaluated this phenomenon and determined
that this disparity is the result of variable quality among the broad array of
certifying agencies. In other words, certification of a quality system does
not necessarily take into account the possibility that commitment to the
quality process may decrease post-certification or that certification may be
viewed as a hurdle to cross rather than as a new quality approach that
should be assimilated into the operation and culture of the organization.
Recommended changes to the ISO 9000 regime include calls to (1) reduce
the number of accredited registrars so that more effort can be spent on
accreditation, (2) use product and quality system certifications in
combination, and (3) recognize the value of just-in-time practices. Some of
these changes are reflected in the more recent ISO 9001:2000 framework.55
4. Certification for Consumers: The Wi-Fi Alliance
The Wi-Fi Alliance is a non-profit trade association founded in 1999
and organized by equipment and component providers interested in the
market for IEEE 802.11 wireless local access network equipment. The
alliance had more than 200 member companies by July 2004, and it
certified interoperability of more than 1,500 products between March 2000
and July 2004.56 As with a number of other consortia, the alliance is
54
Norman Burgess, Lessons Learned in Quality Management – A Rational Role for Certification, IEEE
SYMPOSIUM ON PROS AND CONS OF ISO 9000 ACCREDITED CERTIFICATION 1998/421, 1/1-1/3 (March 31, 1999).
55
See Id. See also L. Paul Dreyfus, Sanjay L. Ahire, & Maling Ebrahimpur, The Impact of Just-in-Time
Implementation and ISO 9000 Certification on Total Quality Management, 51 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON
ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, May 2, 2004, at 125-141, and E. Davies & M. Whyman, ISO 9000:2000 – New
ISO, New Responsibilities for Top Management, 10 ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 5, (Oct. 2000), at
244-48. See also Eitan Naveh & Alfred A. Marcus, When Does the ISO 9000 Quality Assurance Standard Lead
to Performance Improvement? Assimilation and Going Beyond, 51 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING
MANAGEMENT 3 (2004), at 352-63.
56
See
the
Wi-Fi
Alliance
website,
available
at
http://www.wi-fi.org/OpenSection/
backgrounder.asp?TID=5.
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intended to augment an otherwise established standards process (in this
case, IEEE wireless networking) by providing interoperability certification
and by building a consumer brand in order to ensure interoperability of
purchased products. The Wi-Fi Alliance accredits independent testing labs
as Wi-Fi Interoperability Certification Labs. These labs report results to the
Wi-Fi Alliance, which in turn grants certification and the right to display
appropriate Wi-Fi logos.
While only Wi-Fi members can request
certification, the association’s wide membership suggests that barriers to
membership are low; in other words, the association does not seem to
substantially restrict entry in order to limit competition.
5. Self-Regulation and Voluntary Agreements in Environmental Policy
Environmental regulation has seen the most active experimentation
in self-regulation of any area of social policy. A sequence of environmental
disasters (Bhopal, Exxon Valdez, Three Mile Island) and a set of vocal nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) combine to represent public
environmental interests, but recent neo-liberal trends towards deregulation
recognize both the direct and indirect costs of command-and-control
regulation. The result has been a wave of self-regulatory experiments in
which firms and industries enter into voluntary agreements to reduce
environmental impact.57
The environmental self-regulation experience has been decidedly
mixed and has resulted in a number of findings that are beneficial to our
discussion of telecommunications emergency services self-regulation.58
These findings include both theoretical and empirical evidence of the
detrimental impact of free-riding on effective industry-wide voluntary
agreements,59 the importance of external stakeholder involvement in
negotiating credible voluntary agreements,60 the critical role of public
monitoring of conformance with voluntary agreements by independent

57

See T. Dietz & P. C. Stern, NEW TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: EDUCATION, INFORMATION,
MEASURES (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2002); F. Convery & F. Lévêque,
Applying Voluntary Approaches – Some Insights in RESEARCH IN ENVIRONMENTAL VOLUNTARY APPROACHES:
RESEARCH INSIGHTS FOR POLICY-MAKERS FROM THE POLICY WORKSHOP ON THE USE OF VOLUNTARY
APPROACHES (Brussels, 2001).
58
See T. Lookabaugh & D. C. Sicker, Self-Regulation of E911 for VoIP: Lessons for the Cable Industry
from Environmental Voluntary Agreements, MAGNESS INSTITUTE ACADEMIC SEMINAR, San Francisco, CA, 2005.
59
See A. A. King & M. J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry
Responsible Care Program, 43 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 4 (2000), at 698-716; J. Rivera & P. D.
Leon, Is Greener Whiter? Voluntary Environmental Performance of Western Ski Areas in 32 THE POLICY
STUDIES JOURNAL 3 (2004), at 417-437.
60
See J. Carmin, N. Darnall, et al., Stakeholder Involvement in the Design of U.S. Voluntary Environmental
Programs: Does Sponsorship Matter? in 31 POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL 4 (2003), at 527-544.
AND VOLUNTARY
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parties,61 and the importance of a plausible threat of governmental
regulation.62
6. Certification Evolves: Telecommunications Certification Bodies
Until the late 1990s, the regulatory procedure for standardizing and
certifying devices for sale to the general public under FCC rules had not
changed significantly. For example, a company that wanted to market
devices that connect to the telephone network under Part 263 64 or Part 6865
of the FCC rules (described below) had to first complete a series of tests,
which were either performed in the company’s own laboratory or
outsourced to a third party. The actual testing process tended to take
anywhere from one day to one week, and the test results had to be submitted
to the FCC. The centrally controlled FCC approval process took up to three
months, and the device could not be properly marketed in large commercial
applications until it received FCC approval. The above example highlights
the FCC’s device-level command-and-control approach.
The questions, then, are these: What are these FCC rules, and why is
device certification relevant in this context? The answer to these questions
is simple: Virtually every device that connects to the network must meet
certain FCC specifications before it can appear on the market. FCC Part 2,
for example, is a massive collection of technical data spanning several
hundred pages. It covers international regulations, nomenclature and
assignment of frequencies, and the complete table of frequency allocations.
FCC Part 68, in turn, regulates the connection of terminal equipment to the
telephone network, and any device that is regulated under Part 68 (e.g., the
limits set for intentional and unintentional radiation) must also comply with
the provisions of Part 15. Part 68 is important for future wireless
applications, because any change in FCC regulations or policy is likely to
affect all interrelated FCC compliance regulations simultaneously. In the
VoIP area, as we will see, new Internet-enabled telephones will easily span
all of these areas and will require certification under many different parts of
the FCC rules.

61
See K. Harrison & W. Antweiler, Incentives for Pollution Abatement: Regulation, Regulatory Threats, and
Non-Governmental Pressures in 22 JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 3 (2003), at 361-382.
62
See M. Khanna, Non-Mandatory Approaches to Environmental Protection in 15 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC
SURVEYS 3 (2001), at 219-324; A. Alberini & K. Segerson, Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve
Environmental Quality in 22 ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS (2002), at 157-184.
63
47 CFR Ch. 1 (1998), Part 2—Frequency Allocations and Radio Treaty Matters; General Rules and
Regulations.
64
Id.
65
47 CFR Ch. 1 (1998), Part 68—Connection of Terminal Equipment to the Telephone Network.
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Indeed, even the most banal wireless applications (such as cordless
phones) are regulated under Part 68 (for their connection to the network),
Part 15 (for their radiation limitations in a broadcasting capacity), and Part 2
(for their placement in the frequency allocation zoning map). In fact, future
technologies—like VoIP devices—are likely to dramatically increase the
complexity involved in adhering to FCC regulations. For example,
regulators used to be able to categorize transmitters and receivers with
relative ease in a bygone era when television and radio were the primary
subjects of regulation. Today, however, new technological advances are
supplanting these categorizations, and hybrid applications no longer fit
neatly within any single FCC provision. Examples of these
re-categorizations include frequencies originally intended for UHF
television that have been reallocated for cellular66 and frequencies originally
intended for garage-door openers67 that are now used for cordless phones,
wireless in-home LAN, car alarms, and electronic dog fences.
Categorization is quickly losing its meaning, and future regulations will
likely have to address purely technical criteria rather than applicationspecific criteria.
Although VoIP is sometimes characterized as a
revolutionary technology, in terms of its development it is merely one of
several hundred new devices or products entering the marketplace.
In 1998, the FCC anticipated that its rules would not be able to keep
up with technological advancements, and it shifted away from its traditional
command-and-control paradigm by adopting ET Docket 97-94.68 The
FCC’s action amended certain rules in order to
1) simplify our existing equipment authorization processes;
2) deregulate the equipment authorization requirements for
certain types of equipment; and 3) provide for electronic
filing of applications for equipment authorization. The

66
See In the Matter of an Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of the Frequency and 806-960 MHz; and
Amendment of Parts 2, 18, 21, 73, 74, 89, 91 and 93 of the Rules Relative to Operations in the Land Mobile
Service Between 806 and 960 MHz, 46 F.C.C.2d 752 (1974) (discussing the rulemaking procedure that deals with
reallocation of UHF channels for cellular telephone services).
67
The 2.4 GHz frequency band was originally designated for home devices, but it now includes everything
from wireless networking to invisible dog fences. See Kenneth R. Carter, Ahmed Lahjouji, & Neal McNeil,
Unlicensed and Unshackled: A Joint OSP-OET White Paper on Unlicensed Devices and Their Regulatory Issues,
FCC Office of Engineering Technology, OSP Working Paper No. 39, May 2003, available at
www.fcc.gov/osp/workingp.html (last visited August 15, 2003).
68
ET Docket 97-94, Amendment of Parts 2, 15, 18 and Other Parts of the Commission’s Rules to Simplify
and Streamline the Equipment Authorization Process for Radio Frequency Equipment, resulting in Report and
Order 13 FCC Rcd. 11415 (1998), available at http://www.fcc.gov/oet/dockets/et97-94/ (last visited March 11,
2005).
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proposals were designed to reduce the burden of the
equipment authorization program on manufacturers.69
As a result, the FCC shifted the regulatory burden for approval of various
devices to the private sector.70 The thrust of this action, then, was to
organize a provision for so-called Telecommunications Certification Bodies
(TCBs), whose objective is to conduct various tests and certifications
following essentially the same criteria previously employed by the FCC.71
Another component of this plan was the adoption of Mutual Recognition
Agreements (MRAs) to allow foreign parties to evaluate equipment
conformance with U.S. technical requirements.72 The process for approval
under the new regulation is quite simple, and many expect it to have an
important effect on domestic and international commerce. The case may be
most significant in terms of international commerce, where European
organizations have enjoyed advances in standardization through Europewide groups like ETSI73 and CENELEC74 and through country-specific
groups like AFNOR (France),75 the famous TÜV (Germany),76 and others.77
If a U.S. company wants to market a new device to the European Union, the
company must seek out a Conformity Assessment Body (CAB) under
69
FCC Report and Order, ET Docket No. 97-94 Section II (3) (April 1998), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering_Technology/Orders/1998/fcc98058.txt.
70
See Gen. Docket 98-16, Report No. FCC 98-338, entitled “1998 Biennial Regulatory Review –
Amendment of Parts 2, 25 and 68 of the Commission’s Rules to Further Streamline the Equipment Authorization
Process for Radio Frequency Equipment, Modify the Equipment Authorization Process for Telephone Terminal
Equipment, Implement Mutual Recognition Agreements and Begin Implementation of the Global Mobile Personal
Communications by Satellite (GMPCS) Arrangements,” adopted December 17, 1998, released December 23,
1998.
71
TCBs are now captured in 47 CFR Section 2.960, and they are described on the FCC website as follows:
The Commission may designate a Telecommunications Certification Body (TCB) to process an
application to determine whether the product meets the Commission’s requirements and shall
issue a written grant of equipment authorization. A TCB may authorize such devices subject to
Certification as the FCC except new technology devices or devices with unique RF (radio
frequency) safety concerns.
FCC website, available at http://ftp.fcc.gov/oet/ea/procedures.html.
72
Gen. Docket 98-16, at Section II (19). See also Document 98-338, Footnote 36, which points out that the
FCC authorizes the delegation to MRAs, but the specific technical data must be delineated within the bilateral
agreement in question: “The model APEC MRA provides that countries will identify the relevant regulations and
requirements at the time they enter into bilateral agreements.”
73
See the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) website, available at www.etsi.org.
ETSI was borne out of the development of Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) standards across
Europe. See generally Howard A Shelanski, Competition Policy for Mobile Broadband Networks, 3 JOURNAL ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 97, 111-12 (describing GSM and its relationship with ETSI).
74
See the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) website, available at
www.cenelec.org. See also generally Suzanne Laplante, The European Union’s General Product Safety
Directive: Another Call for U.S. Exporters to Comply with the ISO 9000 Series, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM.
155 (1996) (describing the role of various standards-setting organizations in Europe and their relationship with
certification programs like ISO 9000).
75
See the Groupe AFNOR website, available at www.afnor.fr. See also generally Lori M. Wallach,
Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization: the WTO, NAFTA and International Harmonization of
Standards, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 823 (2002) [hereinafter: Wallach, Accountable Governance] (describing AFNOR
and other state-run standards-setting organizations in Europe and elsewhere).
76
See the TÜV Rheinland Group homepage, available at www.tuv.com.
77
See Wallach, Accountable Governance, cited supra at note 75.
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Article 10(2) of the Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive.78 A CAB, also
known in Europe simply as a “Competent Body,”79 is similar to a TCB in
the United States. The European CAB then issues a “Technical Construction
File,” which consists of a technical judgment regarding the overall
compliance of a product. If the company receives a judgment in its favor,
then the device receives the coveted “CE” mark, which can be seen on
virtually all electronic devices sold worldwide.80
Since roughly 1998, the European process and the U.S. process have
grown increasingly similar, and certification bodies (and their processes)
are themselves beginning to standardize on both sides of the Atlantic. In
both the European Union and the United States, companies with approved
telecommunications devices are expected to keep their certification reports
on file in each country where the devices are sold, and the reports must
stand up to scrutiny if device approval is ever questioned. A CAB-certified
(Europe) or TCB-certified (United States) device may pass all tests, but if a
report does not meet with inspector approval or if incorrect test data is
discovered, the company in question may be forced to suspend shipments
until it presents acceptable proof of conformity. In addition to receiving
certification, devices must thus be able to sustain audit.
7. An Expanded Role for Enforcement
It is within this latter inspection and “policing” capacity that the
FCC will continue to perform its own independent surveillance of products
on the market81 using random product testing mechanisms and other
procedures to investigate allegations of non-compliance.82 Ultimately,
however, the certification process of the delegates (the TCBs) will help to
free up FCC resources, marking the beginning of an ongoing shift in the
role of the FCC from command-and-control regulation to ex post
78

The Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Directive 89/336/EEC, available at http://tinyurl.com/4k8n4.
See John Bengston, Connecting Terminal Equipment Under the New EC Regs, 9 COMPUTER LAWYER 7,
32 (1992). The article outlines the early challenges and regulations facing the European Community. The article
may be somewhat outdated now, but it highlights the challenges of setting up uniformity in the pre-GSM
European climate in the early 1990s.
80
See the European Union’s website on Electrical Equipment, available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/enterprise/electr_equipment/index_en.htm.
81
For a discussion of changes made and policing functions (including fines), see David E. Hilliard & Kurt E.
DeSoto, FCC Refines Computer Marketing Regulations, 9 COMPUTER LAWYER 9, 27 (1992) [hereinafter: Hilliard
& DeSoto, FCC Refines Computer Marketing Regulations]. The article discusses the expansion of enforcement at
the FCC level:
[In 1992, the FCC] substantially expanded the enforcement of its computing device rules. … The
penalties for marketing unauthorized or improperly tested computers or computer peripherals
increased [to] (1) civil forfeitures of $75,000 for continuing violations and $10,000 each for other
violations; (2) criminal penalties as high as $500,000 in fines and two years in prison; (3) civil
litigation; and (4) equipment confiscation.
82
FCC Gen. Docket No. 98-68, Report and Order, cited infra at note 84.
79
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enforcement functions. Nonetheless, the FCC remains responsible for
issuing certification to TCBs (a responsibility that it shares in certain cases
with the National Institute of Standards and Technology),83 and the
aforementioned rules allow either the TCB or the FCC to revoke the
interconnection authorization of terminal equipment.84 Thus, the FCC still
retains an important role in enforcement control, and it may even revoke
equipment placed on the market after authorization has been acquired by a
TCB. The law requires the FCC to prove that (1) the equipment approval
has been obtained by misrepresentation, (2) the approved equipment causes
harm to the public switched telephone network, (3) the responsible party
willfully or repeatedly fails to comply with the terms and conditions of its
equipment approval, or (4) the responsible party willfully or repeatedly fails
to comply with any FCC rule, regulation, or order relating to terminal
equipment under the Communications Act of 1934.
It is not yet known if the enforcement arm of the FCC will prove
effective, especially in cases where a TCB certifies the commercial
application of a product that subsequently interferes with other entities.
Bell Atlantic raised this issue, contending that foreign certification of
equipment could introduce partiality into the authorization process and lead
to inconsistent application of standards. Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence
suggests that the increasing number of FCC representatives at events such
as COMDEX,85 where new technologies are often shown to the public,86
demonstrates the organization’s willingness to embrace its enforcement
role.
The more pressing question, however, is this: how will the FCC
actually go about setting up deterrents to prevent wrongs, such as the
proliferation of, say, an inexpensive, uncertified VoIP device that enters the
market and takes off rapidly? It may be difficult or even impossible to
recall all of the devices, especially if they realize major sales within a short
83

See “Accreditation of Telecommunications Certification Bodies (TCBs) and Certification Bodies (CBs)
under the Mutual Recognition Arrangement (MRA),” National Institute of Standards and Technology website,
available at http://ts.nist.gov/ts/htdocs/210/gsig/tcb-program.htm (last visited March 15, 2005).
84
See FCC Gen. Docket No. 98-68, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (1998), at 15, available at
www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering_Technology/Notices/1998/fcc98092.pdf (“[W]e anticipate that circumstances
may arise where it may be necessary to suspend or revoke a TCB’s certification authority”). See also FCC Gen
Docket No. 98-68, Report and Order (1998), available at www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering_Technology/Orders/
1998/fcc98338.pdf [hereinafter: FCC Gen. Docket 98-68, Report and Order]. A TCB may revoke a certification
up to thirty days after issuance. However, after thirty days, a certification “can only be revoked by the
Commission. A TCB shall notify both the applicant and the Commission when a grant is rescinded.” Id., at 49.
85
COMDEX is a major technology fair that, until recently, was held annually in Las Vegas. In 2004, the
organizers cancelled the event for the first time because of poor participation from vendors. See Comdex’s
Organizers Cancel This Year’s Show in Las Vegas, WALL ST. JOURNAL, June 24, 2004, 2004 WLNR 7318650.
86
See Hilliard & DeSoto, FCC Refines Computer Marketing Regulations, cited supra at note 81 (stating that
in fall 1991 the FCC issued more than 100 violations to vendors who exhibited unauthorized computer equipment
at COMDEX).
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period of time (such as during the Christmas season). The device
manufacturers could be sham organizations purchased through international
e-commerce portal sites—or even offshore companies—making them very
difficult to monitor from the FCC’s point of view. Only through efficient
delegation to third-party authorities (e.g., the TCBs) will the FCC have any
opportunity to allocate the resources needed to police the proliferation and
e-commerce distribution of new technologies.
8. Certification Processes
Each of the preceding examples involves a certification process
from which we can abstract the following common and desirable elements:
•

Pre-Certification.
Certification processes, expectations, and
procedures are well-documented, and certification officials have
easy access to educational and background materials. If the
certification process is sufficiently complex, a third-party
community of trainers, consultants, and test equipment providers
will participate in certification activities. The goal is to facilitate a
standard, straightforward, repeatable process. Fees are documented,
predictable, and reasonable.

•

Certification. Testing and evaluation against the certification
criteria take place. Certification of easily transportable equipment
occurs at specified test facilities, preferably facilities that are
conveniently (or even regionally) located. Certification teams go on
site to test equipment that is non-transportable and to evaluate
facilities, infrastructures, or processes. Testing is prompt and
transparent, and it follows designated guidelines.

•

Post-Certification. The certifying authority follows a clear process
that clarifies deadlines and formats for reporting test results. The
reasons for any failures are clearly documented, and comments and
recommendations are suggested. The certifying authority follows a
clear and transparent procedure for questioning and appealing
results and for publicizing successful certification, both by the
certifier and by the certified body. A publicly accessible database
contains successful certification results. The certification authority
documents and institutes a periodic follow-up re-inspection process.
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C. Implications for VoIP Emergency Services Certification
We can make several general observations about VoIP emergency
services certification based on the preceding theories and specific examples
of certification.
(These observations will then inform specific
recommendations provided in Section VI.) To begin, certification of
emergency service capabilities for VoIP better fits the category of
certification for social policy goals than certification for economic reasons,
mainly because firms have not traditionally been able to charge consumers
for 911 services.87 The implication is that standards and related certification
bodies are not likely to arise unless they are naturally driven by the
industry’s own economic interest (as is the case with TCBs such as
Telcordia, CableLabs, and Wi-Fi Alliance).
General evidence suggests that social policy self-regulation requires
strong external motivation. In the case of VoIP emergency services,
associations of public safety officials, such as the National Emergency
Number Association (NENA) and the Association of Public Safety
Communications Officers, already play an active role in prompting selfregulatory discussions.88 However, the effectiveness of this external
motivation is seemingly derived largely from the presumption that these
organizations have the ears of regulators at the local and federal levels. For
example, no truly separate non-governmental organizations play an active
regulatory role (e.g., by influencing consumers). Hence, it appears likely
that government influence, either direct or indirect, is needed in this case.
Such influence can naturally take a number of forms. The government
could inspire self-regulation through the credible threat of potential
regulation, or it could actively share regulation responsibilities with social
policy organizations. Moreover, although the FCC is the most obvious
choice to take the reins of such social policy regulatory initiatives,
government influence could also come from state agencies (assuming they
can be sufficiently coordinated to be effective) or from a combination of
federal and state agencies.
In short, social policy self-regulation faces a credibility challenge.
Consequently, certification processes should not be held captive to the
certifying body, which could make the standards subject to use in extracting
87

Firms subject to rate regulation may remain relatively neutral toward the imposition of 911 requirements if
they are able to recover costs through a general increase in prices. However, we expect many firms involved in
VoIP to be excluded from rate regulation and consequently motivated to avoid costs without offsetting revenues
unless other issues, such as the threat of government regulation, arise.
88
See the National Emergency Number Association website, available at http://www.nena9-11.org/VoIP_IP/index.htm and http://www.apcointl.org.
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monopoly rents (by restricting industry participation) or could induce the
standards to be set at inappropriate performance levels.89 One option here is
the use of a broad-based standards-setting organization that openly invites
the participation of other parties, such as government and consumer
organizations. In parallel, it would be valuable to create a “hierarchy of
trust” of accrediting certifiers, whereby the root accrediting organization
remains credibly independent of the certified companies. This role of the
root accrediting organization can be played by the government, as in the
case of OSHA, or by a sufficiently independent group of institutions, as in
the case of the ISO 9000 series of standards. The role should probably not
be played by a major industry firm, as in the case of Verizon’s testing
certification lab, or by a tightly controlled industry consortium.90
Many certification processes that involve conformance testing are
overseen by a competitive market of certifiers (e.g., product safety
certification, telephone company product interoperability certification, and
ISO 9000 quality system certification). Such an approach may work for
VoIP emergency services certification as well.
Note, though, that
implementation of this approach would reinforce the need for a hierarchy of
accreditation so that the certifiers’ capabilities can be trusted.
Furthermore, VoIP emergency services certification is likely to
consist mainly of software certification. Here, it would be wise to
encourage certification processes that engage with software development
throughout its cycle rather than solely at the cycle’s end. Also, some
aspects of VoIP emergency service performance will depend on network and
system characteristics that can be expected to vary widely among VoIP
providers. An element of system meta-management standardization and
certification, similar to ISO 9000, may be appropriate in such
heterogeneous circumstances, but we need to learn from the ISO 9000
experience so that we do not rely solely on process certification to control
outcomes.
In fact, consumers can play a key role in discriminating between
certified and non-certified firms and between different levels of certification
through their buying choices. Examples of such consumer involvement
include certification by UL and the Wi-Fi Alliance. However, for the
89

As noted earlier, standards can be set too high (in an effort to restrict competition) or too low (in an effort
to reduce industry costs at the expense of overall welfare).
90
While the Wi-Fi Alliance is clearly a membership-restricted industry consortium, it nonetheless has a
fairly open membership policy; as such, it is subject to little criticism of “tight control.” However, even an
organization with broad industry membership risks the possibility that opaque and self-interested policies, the
kind that are sufficient to undermine credibility, could be implemented.
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certification to be effective, consumers need to be aware of the
certification’s implications and confident in its legitimacy, thus implying an
investment in consumer awareness and in policing inappropriate assertions
of certification. These functions can be accomplished through the
combined efforts of the government and industry trade associations (e.g.,
the Wi-Fi Alliance), both of which create a brand around certification,
obtain legal rights to certification marks, and prosecute infringers, as well as
by individual certified firms, which are generally motivated to promote the
significance of certification in order to differentiate themselves from noncertified firms.
Finally, careful consideration of the role of insurance and liability
mitigation could accelerate regulatory progress and industry participation
beyond that which would be naturally motivated by the threat of
government regulation.
Here again, government involvement can
potentially help. For example, governmental roles, such as in setting
appropriate standards and serving as the root accrediting body for certifiers,
can enhance the status of standards and the broad acceptance of
certification. Insurance industry participation in standards setting and in
institutional design of certification is also desirable if it leads to differential
premiums for industry participants based on certification.
III. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
In this section, we will provide a technology assessment of VoIP
emergency services based on a classification of fundamental trends in
technology and protocol models. We will begin by reviewing the basic
operations and functions of today’s emergency services. Next, we will
discuss the engineering and operations of VoIP systems. Finally, we will
describe how VoIP emergency services might be implemented and offer a
set of possible (preliminary) VoIP emergency services requirements.
A. Emergency Services and the PSTN
In the context of the PSTN, emergency services in the United States
have long been known by the dialing convention 9-1-1.91 When this
number is dialed, an emergency call is routed to the appropriate public
safety answering point (PSAP) and then routed to fire, medical, or law
enforcement agencies, as appropriate. Enhanced 911 (E911) added a
capability that enables the emergency services dispatcher to see the calling
91
For background on 911, see “911 Services,” Federal Communications Commission website, available at
http://www.fcc.gov/911.
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number and information about the caller’s location. Regulations imposed
on emergency services obligations vary across services, technologies, and
local, national, and international borders.92 In the United States, certain
carriers are required to support 911 service (under the 911 Act),93 with
regulatory responsibility divided among federal, state, and local
authorities.94
In traditional E911, the initial routing of a 911 call is provided by the
central office, which uses a routing database to associate the caller with the
appropriate PSAP. E911 provides calling number information in the
Automatic Number Identification (ANI) and location information in the
Automatic Location Information (ALI), and it assumes that the PSAP that
receives the call is geographically related to the call origination location
(this routing process is accomplished using a selective router database
search). The PSAP then accesses a Public Safety-Automatic Line
Information (PS-ALI) database to associate the calling number with a
physical location. At this point, the PSAP may forward the call to an
emergency call center, which performs another database search (on a
database maintained by the telephone company) to associate the caller’s
phone number with a particular location.
B. Emergency Services and Wireless
Many of the problems facing VoIP emergency services are similar to
those of emergency services for commercial mobile radio service
(“wireless” telephony). Although the technologies are different, some of the
same solution mechanisms apply. For example, the development and
adoption of wireless emergency service solutions followed a long and
convoluted path.95 While many of the issues that arose were attributed to
92
Although common in many respects, emergency services regulation in the European Union differs from
emergency services regulation in the United States. A simple but obvious difference is the emergency number
itself (911 in the United States, 112 in Europe). “Commission Recommendation on the Processing of Caller
Location Information in Electronic Communication Networks for the Purpose of Location-Enhanced Emergency
Call Services,” July 25, 2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_189/
l_18920030729en00490051.pdf).
93
“In the Matter of Implementation of 911 Act: The Use of N11 Codes and Other Abbreviated Dialing
Arrangements,” Fifth Report and Order (CC Docket No. 92-105) and First Report and Order (WT Docket No.
00-110), 2001.
94
For example, the 911 Act requires the FCC to take a leadership and support role in implanting wireless
911, but the Act does not give the FCC the authority to regulate statewide plans. “About State 911 Deployment
Plans,” Federal Communications Commission website, available at http://www.fcc.gov/911/stateplans/
about.html.
95
Dale N. Hatfield, Challenges of Network Design in an Increasingly Deregulated, Competitive Market,
Remarks
at
the
IEEE
International
Symposium,
March
27,
2003,
available
at
http://www.im2003.org/presentation%20files/RemarksDH_IM2003.doc. See also A Report on the Technical and
Operational
Issues
Impacting
Wireless
Enhanced
911
Services,
2002,
available
at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6513296239, and Dale Hatfield,
Architecture as Policy, in SHERRIE BOLIN, ED., THE STANDARDS EDGE: DYNAMIC TENSION (2004).
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technical uncertainty (due to an inadequate level of technical understanding
early in the process), a significant number of the delays were the direct
result of industry resistance (due to the absence of strict timelines). Another
issue to consider is whether or not certain policy approaches might hasten
the development effort. In the wireless emergency services regulatory
process, the FCC played a substantial role in specifying and assessing the
technical characteristics of the location technology.
This initiative
consumed considerable time. An industry-led specification and assessment
process might have hastened this process, particularly if regulatory agencies
had monitored the process and set deadlines. Another issue to consider is
that of the implementation process itself. Wireless emergency services
made use of a phased implementation approach that considered short-term
versus long-term solutions. Such an approach can help to promote interim
solutions and allow for the creation of reasonable timelines for long-term
solutions.96
One important lesson worth considering is this: past regulations
should not necessarily be used to define future policy. Different
technologies operate in different ways, and these variations can lead to the
development of new capabilities and features. For example, as Henning
Schulzrinne points out, VoIP offers a number of advantages over voice
telephony, including higher resilience, faster call setup, accessibility
support, multimedia support, greater cost efficiency, more call data, no
telephone reliance, and greater competition.97 In addition, unlike traditional
telephony, IP phones do not need to associate with a local central office, and
they have little to no need for explicit voice service providers. Instead, the
functions of the provider are dispersed and require minimal provider
assistance. The development of policies that do not appreciate such
differences could signal the loss of technical opportunities to better serve
society.

96
An FCC news release describes the obligations imposed on certain carriers in terms of providing
emergency services. The regulations on carriers are imposed in two phases, the first of which requires carriers to
report the wireless caller’s phone number at the location of the antenna that received the call. The E911 second
phase requires wireless carriers to provide the precise location of a 911 caller within 50 to 100 meters.
Deployment of the second phase began in October 2001 and is scheduled for completion by December 31, 2005.
See
FCC
Expands
E911
Rules,
FCC
NEWS,
November
13,
2003,
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-241214A1.pdf.
97
See Henning Schulzrinne, 9-1-1 Calls for Voice-Over-IP, Ex-Parte Filing for Docket 94-102, February 28,
2003, available at www.cs.columbia.edu/IRT/papers/emergency.pdf.
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C. VoIP Technology
In simple terms, VoIP carries speech over an IP-based network.98
The power and complexity of VoIP come largely from its ability to separate
functions that were traditionally bound together, such as transport and
signaling, thereby providing many more options for each function based on
ubiquitous and increasingly inexpensive IP-based networking and IPcompatible access technologies, processing, and storage.
1. VoIP Parameters
IP networks may not offer the same level of performance as circuitswitched networks for voice communications. In order to obtain a similar
level of performance, we must explicitly consider specific VoIP parameters,
such as encoding, delay, and transport.
On a VoIP telephone call, voice is transmitted over packet networks.
This transmission requires the conversion of analog voice to a digitized
form, followed by a subsequent encapsulation of the digital content into a
packet technology before the content is transmitted using an access
technology. The initial analog conversion process is referred to as
encoding.99 After the analog content has been encoded into a digital format,
the information is packetized (with the help of a transport layer)100 and
passed to the access technology (e.g., Ethernet) for delivery on the network.
At the other end, the digital information is retrieved and converted back into
98
The difference between VoIP providers and VoIP services is worth considering. VoIP as a product can be
offered much like any other software application (e.g., Microsoft Word). Some VoIP products can be installed on
a PC and made to run with little (or no) service provider participation. Some of the simpler products include
NetMeeting, which is sold by software giant Microsoft. See the description on Microsoft’s NetMeeting website,
available at http://www.microsoft.com/windows/netmeeting/. Vonage, a service provider, also sells a product that
can be loaded onto an individual’s computer. See the description on Vonage’s website, available at
http://www.vonage.com/features.php?feature=softphone. Such products make use of the network to reach other
end points and rely on so-called “intelligence” within the product (i.e., software features or information added to
the product, such as through software updates). On the other hand, a VoIP service provider can augment a
product by including additional functionality, routing and database capabilities, security, and more. In this model,
the product may still be software, or it may be a combination of physical devices and software coupled closely to
the service provider.
99
In digital telephony over the traditional PSTN network, voice is usually encoded using PCM-u or PCM-A,
resulting in a bandwidth requirement of 56-64 Kbps. However, a variety of different compression algorithms can
be applied in VoIP, providing all participating terminals have the required capability. Various algorithms can
introduce quality, delay, computation, and bandwidth tradeoffs. For example, G.723.1 reduces the bandwidth
usage of the call to 5.3 Kbps, but it also introduces a computational delay of 67.5 ms. See generally DANIEL
COLLINS, CARRIER GRADE VOICE OVER IP (McGraw-Hill, 2000).
100
Typically, the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) adds important timing and other information relevant
to voice and other time-sensitive media traffic. Next, the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) provides limited
multiplexing and data detection. Unlike its peer protocol, TCP, UDP does not provide error recovery; instead,
error management is left to RTP and the voice codec used. Finally, UDP packets are placed in IP packets and
delivered to a specified Internet address. See generally COLIN PERKINS, RTP: AUDIO AND VIDEO FOR THE
INTERNET (Addison-Wesley Professional Publishing, 2003).
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analog form, which the listener can then understand. VoIP permits a wider
range of choices and tradeoffs among performance parameters than
traditional PSTN. These choices and tradeoffs include the following:
•

Distortion. Low bit rate compression may be bandwidth efficient,
but it may also distort speech.

•

Errors. Voice traffic has some degree of error tolerance (e.g., a
small amount of missing information will not impact intelligibility,
whereas even a small error in a financial transaction is considered
intolerable). However, a high enough error rate from lost packets or
errored packets degrades data intelligibility.

•

Delay. Compression algorithms, packetization, and other stages of
packet transmission induce delay. Delays in excess of 250
milliseconds can be annoying, and long delays tend to induce a halfduplex conversation in which each party pauses for a substantial
period of time after speaking to determine if the other party wants to
speak.

•

Loaded Networks and Quality of Service. Both errors and delay
are affected by whether or not the networks involved in transmitting
the voice are loaded (i.e., whether they are subject to traffic that
occupies a substantial fraction of their capacity) and whether or not
they have some form of prioritization capability (i.e., quality of
service, or QoS). Loaded networks that lack QoS typically induce
long and variable delays (jitter) and sometimes drop packets.

•

Echo. Echo, a traditional issue in analog telephony, can still be an
issue in VoIP, depending on the design of the analog portions of the
system.

•

Power. Analog PSTN terminals can be powered by the phone
network. Assuming that the phone network has backup power, the
system (including 911 service) can remain operational even if the
customer premises is without power. VoIP systems do not
automatically have such a backup system (although, to be fair,
neither do cordless phones, which are connected to the PSTN).

For emergency services, we are concerned with the potential impact of these
characteristics on the intelligibility of calls and on users’ capability to place
emergency service calls during power outages.
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2. VoIP Signaling
While the traditional functions of setting up and tearing down calls
persist in VoIP, VoIP can augment these functions in many ways by
exploiting ubiquitous IP networks and inexpensive processing and storage
capabilities. VoIP signaling protocols control these functions, and these
protocols continue to evolve and include several variants (in some cases
competing variants, in other cases, complementary). The most important
variants are the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), H.323, media gateway
protocols,101 and a number of proprietary protocols. Here, we focus
primarily on the role of SIP-based systems in supporting emergency
services.
SIP,102 a protocol developed within the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF),103 provides for the establishment, modification, and
termination of sessions (or calls). A SIP network generally consists of user
agents, proxies, registrars, and redirect servers, all interconnected via an IP
network. These devices exchange messages in a process used to establish
the call, and they do so in a manner analogous to the now widespread
packet-signaling system used in the PSTN, Signaling System 7 (SS7). SIP
could enable emergency services enhancements by providing a richer
information set than ANI and ALI. For example, an individual could
program a VoIP device to transmit medical records or emergency contact
instructions to an emergency calling center (via SIP). Such functions, if
considered highly desirable socially and executable at a reasonable cost,
could easily become subjects of future social policy, or, as we suggest in
this paper, self-regulation.

101

Media gateway protocols include the Media Gateway Control Protocol (MGCP), MEGACO, and H.248.
A media gateway might be used to interface between a VoIP network and the PSTN, and a media gateway
controller interacts with the signaling systems in each domain and manages the configuration of the media
gateway. The separation of voice processing from management and the capability to independently distribute the
functions result in an architecture called softswitch. VoIP architectures in which softswitch and interfacing to the
PSTN play a substantial role generally provide less end user control over system behavior. However, such
constraints may aid in the implementation of traditional PSTN system functionality, including E911. In any case,
this type of architecture will be important for a substantial period (likely measured in multiple decades), while
VoIP and PSTN systems must coexist. See generally Alexandra M. Wilson, Voice Over Internet Protocol: Ready
for Prime Time, PLI Order Number 6061, 819 PLI/Pat 421, February-March 2005 (describing the basic
functionalities of VoIP and a media gateway).
102
J. Rosenberg et. al., Session Initiation Protocol, IETF Network Working Group Request for Comments
No. 3261 (2002), available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3261.txt [hereinafter, RFC 3261].
103
Two IETF working groups, SIP and SIPPING, are active in the development of session-related protocols.
These groups have developed various standards (Requests for Comments, or RFCs) and drafts, and SIP RFC 3261
represents the core protocol. Id.
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D. Emergency Services for VoIP
As a basis for a technical model, we turn to the work of the IETF.
The IETF has developed several Internet Drafts and Requests for
Comments describing the potential operation of VoIP emergency services
based on the use of SIP and associated protocols. In this section, we will
briefly describe these works in progress and highlight areas relevant to our
model. While some of these drafts will not reach maturity, we should
nonetheless be able to describe a reasonable VoIP emergency services
model based on this work.
We propose the following VoIP emergency services requirements,
which are based loosely on work within the IETF:104 (1) support a
reasonable QoS connection,105 (2) use a recognized emergency service
number (the equivalent of 9-1-1) to identify an emergency call, (3) route
calls to the appropriate response group (PSAP), (4) establish a means of
locating the caller, (5) establish a means of identifying the caller, and
(6) establish a means of testing the system.106 Other concerns involving
security or network operations are more general to VoIP, though they still
may warrant consideration during the process of testing VoIP emergency
service operations. Furthermore, mechanisms for privacy, authentication,
authorization, and availability will be required.
We should note that much of the operation of SIP-based emergency
services would rely on well-established and commonly deployed protocols,
including SIP,107 Domain Name Service (DNS), Realtime Transport
Protocol (RTP)108 and ENUM.109 In addressing the functionality not
provided within these specifications, we turn to various draft documents,
which establish that the SIP community is resolving many of the problems
associated with VoIP emergency services. A draft entitled “Emergency
104
Henning Schulzrinne, Emergency Calling, IETF Working Document, October 18, 2004, available at
draft-schulzrinne-sipping-emergency-arch-02. Note that IETF documents are referenced, posted, and archived in
different locations on the Internet. The previous citation string should lead to the document if that string is cut
and pasted it into any search engine. This citation methodology is used periodically in this section.
105
We realize that this requirement is not a part of the IETF specifications and that many people will
question its need. Nonetheless, if the communications cannot support the intended media (or negotiate a new
media type), the rest of the emergency services mechanisms are moot.
106
VoIP-based emergency services users and service providers may wish to test the operation of their
service. Such testing might be motivated by reconfigurations, new installations, power outages, changes in
service or service provider, changes in location, or simple maintenance testing. As the industry stands today,
there really is no mechanism for consumers to complete a “test call” to E911, and the first call that consumers
make is likely to be made in times of emergency. Thus, a policy and process for testing may be valuable.
107
See RFC 3261, cited supra at note 102.
108
RTP is the protocol used for carrying traffic such as voice and video on the Internet. See
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1889.txt.
109
ENUM is a domain name service that supports the translation between Internet addresses (URLs) and
telephone numbers. See generally the ENUM website, available at www.enum.org.
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Services for Internet Telephony Systems,” for example, describes how SIP
might be used to provide emergency services,110 proposes an architecture
based on existing SIP features, and makes use of DNS mechanisms to
provide location mapping. A second draft entitled “Emergency Services
URI for the Session Initiation Protocol”111 defines two universal emergency
SIP Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs), which can be thought of as
emergency numbers like 9-1-1, and suggests ways to increase the likelihood
of being able to contact an emergency call center.
Moreover, several drafts address the problem of location
identification112 by specifying the use of object formats, privacy
mechanisms, and other protocols. Other drafts propose methods of
conveying user agent capabilities and profiles, both of which help to
provide a fully functioning emergency system.113 An important emergency
service capability is caller authentication,114 and the SIP specification
documents authentication techniques, as do a number of draft documents.
Finally, it is worth noting that the provision of VoIP emergency services
needs to account for interfacing between the PSTN and VoIP networks. As
indicated in greater detail below, early implementations of VoIP emergency
services have been designed largely within the context of interfaced VoIP
and PSTN networks, with PSAPs and emergency service responders on the
PSTN side.115
A phased approach could be employed to replicate emergency
services functionality in the SIP VoIP environment, as described by Henning

110

See Henning Schulzrinne, SIPPING, available at draft-schulzrinne-sipping-emergency-arch-01.
See Henning Schulzrinne, Emergency Services URI for the Session Initiation Protocol, IETF Document
(work in progress), February 2004, available at draft-ietf-sipping-sos-00.
112
See J. Peterson, A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object Format, IETF Document (work in
progress), June 2004, available at draft-ietf-geopriv-pidf-lo-02. See also J. Polk, Requirements for Session
Initiation Protocol Location Conveyance, IETF Document (work in progress), February 2004, available at draftietf-sipping-location-requirements-00; J. Polk, et. al., Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol Option for
Coordinate-based Location Configuration Information, IETF Document (work in progress), December 2003,
available at draft-ietf-geopriv-dhcp-lci-option-03; Henning Schulzrinne, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
(DHCPv4 and DHCPv6) Option for Civic Addresses, IETF Document (work in progress), July 2004, available at
draft-ietf-geopriv-dhcp-civil-03; and Anthony LaMarca, et al., Place Lab: Device Positioning Using Radio
Beacons in the Wild, Intel Research Technical Report, IRS-TR-04-016, October 2004, available at
http://www.placelab.org.
113
See D. Petrie, A Framework for Session Initiation Protocol User Agent Profile Delivery, IETF Document
(work in progress), May 2004, available at draft-ietf-sipping-config-framework-03; J. Rosenberg, Indicating User
Agent Capabilities in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), IETF Document (work in progress), January 2004,
available at draft-ietf-sip-callee-caps-03.
114
A user authentication capability should help prevent such problems as crank calls. However, a failed
authorization could result from an administrative or technical problem. Accordingly, a response mechanism and
an authentication policy need to be established.
115
See e.g., http://www1.avaya.com/enterprise/whitepapers/lb1879.pdf and http://www.nena9-1-1.org/9-11TechStandards/Standards_PDF/NENA_03-003.pdf.
111
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Schulzrinne and Knarig Arabshian.116 In the simplest (and likely initial)
case, the SIP elements could connect to the legacy E911 system through a
PSTN gateway. In this case, the SIP device would look much like other
devices commonly attached to the PSTN (e.g., a private branch exchange,
or PBX). This scenario requires development of little new technology,
though a number of existing mechanisms would need to be considered, such
as security, availability, and routing.117 Nonetheless, a certification process
could be useful in terms of ensuring the accuracy of location information.118
Also, a labeling procedure could indicate any additional information that
consumers might need. In a second case, the PSAP would be directly
connected to (or “aware” of) IP network traffic. In other words, a gateway
would not translate INVITE119 messages into PSTN signaling messages;
therefore, the SIP session would occur between the caller and the
emergency call center. As a result, the caller and the emergency call center
would be able to exchange additional information such as the patient’s
video or healthcare data. In this case, the routing, identification, and
location information would probably still reside in telephone company
databases; however, the responder could now communicate with the caller
using a richer media capability (as a result of direct connectivity over IP,
which is able to support multimedia communications). In a third (longterm) case, the routing, identification, and location information would now
reside within the Internet, and the INVITE message would carry the traffic
to the PSAP. The elements within the SIP network could gather the
appropriate routing and location information using a number of mechanisms
(e.g., the use of DNS in mapping locations to PSAPs and emergency call
centers). While the details of such a process are outside the scope of this
paper, these details may nonetheless prove extremely relevant to the
certification mechanisms that could be deployed.
As the preceding paragraphs suggest, VoIP emergency services
could be developed by making enhancements to existing SIP-based
networks. The point is that these capabilities either currently exist or will
soon exist. The challenge now involves the actual implementation of these
capabilities, which is where a certification process can help.

116
Henning Schulzrinne & Knarig Arabshian, “Providing Emergency Services in Internet Telephony,” an
FCC E911 Solutions Summit, March 2004.
117
Many security and routing technologies already exist. For example, the process of authentication and
authorization could be based on existing mechanisms or SIP techniques and later could possibly be based on traitbased mechanisms currently under development.
118
As Schulzrinne describes, location information may need to be manually configured, measured by the end
system (GPS), conveyed to the end system, or provided within the network. Id., at 29.
119
An INVITE message is a used in SIP to serve as the mechanism for requesting a session (a call) with
another user.
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E. Technology Requirements
To assist in defining the characteristics of this process, we will next
examine high-level requirements for VoIP emergency services. We propose
that the certification process should first support a phased implementation.
While interim solutions are available immediately, some aspects of the
longer-term solution will require additional technical development, further
industry negotiations (with possible regulatory intervention), and
considerable investment. Therefore, as both NENA and Schulzrinne
describe, a short-term solution—attaching IP devices to the PSTN
emergency services in much the same way as the devices are attached to a
PBX—should be available for certification now. A longer-term solution—
where IP interfaces with the PSAP directly, the PSAP participates in the IP
session, and the databases are IP accessible—should also be specified as
soon as possible.
Together with this phased approach, we propose that the technology
specifications should support a range of technologies. For example, a
certification process should be developed for other IP services such as
instant messaging or videophone. Further, we believe that various levels of
specification should be available within a technology. For example, several
levels of VoIP certification might be made available (e.g., good, better, and
best).
Below we propose a so-called straw man (a provisional, exploratory
sketch) of the high-level specifications that might be required of a highquality VoIP service (a “best” service level). Note that this service could be
running as software, an IP phone, or another device.120 Also note that we
focus on certifying and labeling the VoIP end device rather than the
network.
•

General capability. provide information to end users through such
means as device labeling or software notification

•

General capability. provide reasonable quality of service (e.g.,
meet the performance and reliability measures previously discussed)

•

System capability. access the emergency services infrastructure

•

System capability. form proper emergency services messages

120

While other network requirements exist, these requirements are beyond the scope of this paper.
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•

System capability. accurately determine and communicate the
proper location of VoIP applications and callers

•

End user capability. participate in an authentication process

•

End user capability. initiate emergency services calls using a
recognized emergency number (e.g., 911 or SOS)

•

End user capability. test the emergency services applications

The details of how these requirements might be assessed remain to be
determined. Furthermore, other requirements also warrant consideration
(and perhaps some of the requirements listed above merit debate).
Accordingly, we welcome comments and feedback.
IV. TRENDS IN CERTIFICATION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION:
A BRIEF VIEW OF THE EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN APPROACHES
We have briefly seen earlier in this article that Europe and the
United States have historically taken different approaches to standardization
and certification and that many U.S. approaches have been borrowed from
the European tradition. We have also seen that the United States and
Europe are slowly harmonizing their approaches through the TCBs. How
might such a collaborative concept also apply to VoIP? One way is to
consider the best mechanism (European or American) for resolving the
liability issues that may arise from VoIP product certification. The United
States offers a consumer-action-based system of legal redress that contrasts
sharply with the preventative measures taken in the European state-based
social system of protections. In the United States, citizens can take legal
action and seek punitive damages for relief if products do not perform as
advertised or if products are defectively designed, manufactured, or labeled.
In Europe, however, the state tends to take a more active role ex ante (i.e.,
before products are launched into the marketplace). The European
approach, then, is to rely on state-sponsored certification, to provide
protections to companies that obtain such certification, and to make
consumer remedies available only as a last recourse.
Europeans tend to be more precautious ex ante than Americans, and
they tend to turn to the state (and to organizations like ETSI) to help set
safety guidelines. In the case of VoIP technology, however, it is almost too
late for European and American regulators to implement preventative
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measures of any kind. Any action, by definition, will be reactive. However,
in other areas of technology—such as wireless telephony—Europeans (and
to some extent Americans) have not hesitated to impose an oxymoronic ex
post precautionary principle to an existing network of wireless telephones
(the precautionary principle will be discussed in greater depth later in this
section).121 We believe that such an ex post approach, if applied to VoIP,
will be unsuccessful, but it may prove instructive to review some of the
differences between European and U.S. approaches in general. As scholar
Adam Burgess explains,
Since the 1980s, Europe has increasingly established an
identity around concern about vaguely conceived threats to
the health of its citizens. Unlike uncaring, free market
America, in this scenario, “social” Europe is aware of the
threat posed by the dangerous products of “unscrupulous”
multinationals.122
It is perhaps helpful to understand that Adam Burgess is a sociologist who
recently published a book that tracks the sociological phenomenon of the
public’s fear of phones (based on the “hysteria factor,” discussed below).123
In the instance cited above, Burgess purposely oversimplifies the
problem—America is not “uncaring,” and Europe’s “aware[ness] of the
threat” does not necessarily exceed that of America. What Burgess is
doing, then, is making an insightful cultural point: where the United States
tends to take an ad hoc, laissez-faire approach to consumer harms, Europe
traditionally takes a more precautionary stance. These markedly different

121
Fears arising from mobile phones triggered protests in Italy that called for the closure of the Vatican’s
broadcast facilities, led to the freezing of wireless deployment in Spain for nearly a year, and caused serious 3G
deployment problems in Germany and elsewhere. As a result, many called for the ex post application of the
precautionary principle to broadcast emissions. In Italy, the Vatican even turned down the emissions due to
hysteria. See Yaroslov Trofimov, Italians Say Potent Vatican Tower Emits Radiation That Poses Cancer Risk,
WALL ST. J., March 27, 2001, at B7A. Several failed U.S. cases also attempted to attach cancer liability to mobile
phone manufacturers. See Motorola v. Ward, 478 S.E.2d. 465 (Ga. App. 1996) (rejecting a claim against a cell
phone manufacturer for causing or exacerbating cancer, due to lack of causation and inconclusive evidence);
Reynard v. NEC Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1500 (M.D.Fla. 1995) (rejecting a plaintiff’s wrongful-death action for lack
of causation and for failure of the Daubert test); Newman v. Motorola, Inc., 218 F.Supp.2d. 769 (D.Md. 2002)
(rejecting a cancer claim against a cell-phone manufacturer for failure of the Daubert test); Chernock v. U.S., 718
F.Supp. 900 (N.D.Fla. 1989) (ruling against several workers’ claims against the government for injuries allegedly
caused by operating radar devices); and In re Wireless Telephone Radio Frequency Emissions Products Liability,
248 F.Supp.2d 452 (D.Md. 2003) (preventing claims brought by five classes of phone purchasers who were not
provided with headsets for use in guarding against possible danger, because federal law sets safety standards and
preempts such claims).
122
Adam Burgess, A Precautionary Tale: The British Response to Cell Phone EMF, 21 IEEE TECHNOLOGY
AND SOCIETY 4, (2003) at 15 [hereinafter: Burgess: A Precautionary Tale].
123
ADAM BURGESS, CELLULAR PHONES, PUBLIC FEARS, AND A CULTURE OF PRECAUTION (Cambridge
University Press: 2003). Burgess seeks to explain how these fears came about in the first place—in both Europe
and the United States—and uses a sociological lens to critique today’s precautionary climate.
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modi operandi and their impact on certification processes cannot be
overlooked.
A. Different Approaches to Product Liability
Interestingly enough, the American and European approaches to
liability have not always been so different, particularly since the United
States once borrowed many of its laws from Europe. Indeed, every firstyear American law student is familiar with a famous judgment that has had
widespread implications on U.S. liability cases. In 1934, Justice Benjamin
Cardozo first articulated and then dismissed the following legal principle,
and he did so in the same judgment: stop, look, and reconnoiter. (Cardozo
had to first articulate the principle and then dismiss it because, in the
tradition of common law, the higher courts have to be clear on the precedent
before reaching a different conclusion.) In plain English, this precept was
originally derived from advice about stopping a car before crossing railroad
tracks. However, the “reconnoiter” aspect is somewhat more complicated,
for it seemingly stipulates that a driver should stop the car, get out, inspect
the area and look for trains (reconnoiter), get back in the car, and, assuming
no trains are approaching, cross the tracks. In this instance, Justice Cardozo
noted that reconnoitering is unnecessary and quite possibly dangerous.124 In
passing this judgment, however, Cardozo reversed an earlier decision by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who had decreed that an individual was
obliged to get out of the vehicle and reconnoiter before crossing the
tracks.125 Not unexpectedly, Cardozo’s reinterpretation of the “stop, look,
and reconnoiter” provision and the greater application of that provision in
the legal world have had a profound effect on the number of civil cases
involving punitive damages that have been tried in the United States during
the past seventy years. When Cardozo declared that individuals no longer
need to reconnoiter before crossing railroad tracks, he initiated a trend that
eventually placed a greater burden on railroad companies, and, in turn, on
manufacturers in general. In short, the state would no longer expect
individuals to take commonsense precautions to protect themselves from
harm; instead, large companies would be held increasingly responsible for
any damages caused by their products.

124

Pokora v. Wabash Railroad Co., 54 S. Ct. 580, 583-84 (1934). Justice Cardozo explained that
[s]tandards of prudent conduct are declared at times by courts, but they are taken over from the
facts of life. To get out of a vehicle and reconnoitre is an uncommon precaution, as everyday
experience informs us. Besides being uncommon, it is very likely to be futile, and sometimes
even dangerous. If the driver leaves his vehicle when he nears a cut or curve, he will learn
nothing by getting out about the perils that lurk beyond. By the time he regains his seat and sets
his car in motion, the hidden train may be upon him.
125
Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
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Here, let us take a step back and look at the philosophical and
linguistic underpinnings of expressions of precaution. The phrase “stop,
look, and reconnoiter” is composed of an unusual mixture of English (stop,
look) and French (reconnoiter, a derivative of the French word
reconnaître).126 Indeed, virtually all American law students have to stop,
look, and reconnoiter—that is, find a dictionary—when they read the
famous case, because the word reconnoiter is not commonly used in the
English language. Indeed, the U.S. approach to consumer protection has
changed drastically in recent decades, as encapsulated by the multibilliondollar sums that tobacco plaintiffs have taken home.127 Certainly, many of
the people who have been diagnosed with or who have died from cancer as
a result of smoking cigarettes did reconnoiter the damage that tobacco
causes to their lungs, and yet many of these individuals and their families
have sought punitive damages and have been compensated accordingly for
pain, suffering, and wrongful death by the cigarette manufacturers. As it
turns out, the leading U.S. cases for punitive damages have all arisen since
the 1980s—and many have since been quashed by the Supreme Court.128
So, returning to Adam Burgess’ quote above, even if Burgess has
oversimplified the American and European outlooks on consumer
protections, he is right to say that the divergence between the two world
views was set in motion at some point in the past century, possibly even in
1934 with Cardozo’s ruling.
Thus, Americans arguably are no longer expected to reconnoiter;
instead, large firms and multinational corporations are seemingly expected
to shoulder the majority of consumer risk, and their perceived
accountability for product defects and failures often translates into
multimillion-dollar (or even multibillion-dollar) settlements. Nonetheless,
the essence of the “stop, look, and reconnoiter” precaution lives on in both
American and European culture in commonplace adages such as “an ounce
of prevention is worth a pound of cure,” “better safe than sorry,” and “look
before you leap.” These expressions have Dutch,129 French,130 and German
126
The French word reconnaître (and its English form, reconnoiter) means to faire une reconnaissance or,
in English, to survey and review. THE COLLINS-ROBERT FRENCH DICTIONARY (1990).
127
See generally Elisabeth J. Calabraser, Unfinished Business: Reaching the Due Process Limits of Punitive
Damages in Tobacco Litigation Through Unitary Classwide Adjudication, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV 979 (2001)
(surveying and discussing the tobacco claims and the multibillion-dollar settlements and awards).
128
See generally Patrick S. Ryan, Revisiting the United States Application of Punitive Damages: Separating
Myth from Reality, 10 ILSA J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 69 (2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=545243
[describing the development of punitive damages as a tort remedy in the United States through recent (2003) U.S.
Supreme Court cases].
129
The following common Dutch phrases are translated more-or-less directly: “beter voorkomen dan
genezen” (it is better to prevent than to cure), “bezint eer ge begint” (reflect before you begin), “beter te hard
geblazen dan de mond gebrand” (it is better to have blown too hard than to have burned your mouth), and “een
gewaarschuwd man is er twee waard” (one warned person is worth two people).
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equivalents,131 as well as equivalents in other languages. The Hippocratic
Oath, which arose out of Greece more than 2,000 years ago, has governed
the actions of physicians for centuries,132 and it offers yet another
interpretation of what will become known as the “precautionary principle.”
According to the oath, each physician is instructed to “prescribe [a] regimen
for the good of my patients according to my ability and my judgment and
never do harm to anyone.” Thus, while the United States has in large part
replaced the “stop, look, and reconnoiter” provision with a legal mechanism
for instituting punitive damages, at one point the U.S. system much more
clearly resembled the European system. In tying this discussion back to the
topic of VoIP telephony, however, we can see that neither Europe nor the
United States has properly prepared for the new challenges that will arise
from the proliferation of VoIP or for the difficulties involved in developing
standards to address emergency services.
B. Technological Development Will Forge Ahead
in the Face of (Pre)caution
Internet telephony will continue to develop, and the absence of an
industry coalition to certify and standardize products will leave an
abundance of different standards and concomitant safety problems. In fact,
the market drivers for VoIP adoption are overwhelming. For example,
Internet telephony will enable foreigners who live in the United States to
communicate with their loved ones in their home countries at virtually no
cost. Furthermore, products like KaZaA’s Skype,133 an application-layer
terminal, are only in their infancy, and, regardless of what happens with the
regulation of E911, these products will continue to develop and appear on
the marketplace. Accordingly, the time is now to develop a certification
process that affords carriers a level of protection that they can rely on.

130
The most common term in French is “il vaut mieux prévenir que guérir” (it is better to prevent than to
heal). Such was the title of a recent article in Switzerland asserting that the precautionary principle should be
applied to “electrosmog” and to radio emissions in general. Jürg Baumann, Smog Électrique: Mieux Vaut Prévenir
que Gúerir, 2 ENVIRONNEMENT 1999, available at http://www.umwelt-schweiz.ch/buwal/fr/medien/umwelt/
1999_2/unterseite4/. The author says “electrosmog is omnipresent in our environment” and suggests that the
precautionary principle should be applied in a proposed law that would greatly regulate and reduce the installation
of new sites.
131
The following common German phrases are translated more-or-less directly: “vorsicht ist die mutter der
porzelankiste” (care is the mother of the box of chinaware), “vorbeugen ist besser als heilen” (prevention is better
than cure), “man muss das uebel bei der wurzel packen” (grab evil by its roots), and “wehret den anfaengen”
[resist the beginnings (of something bad)]. The latter two phrases, outgrowths of Nazi Germany, are often referred
to in a political context. For a list of German aphorisms, see www.aphorismen.de.
132
The Hippocratic Oath is thought to have originated some 2,300 years ago on the Greek Island of Cos. It
remains today the “central document, the most often-cited summary of the physician’s own understanding of what
is morally required to be a good medical doctor.” David L. Katz, Perry v. Louisiana: Medical Ethics on Death
Row — Is Judicial Intervention Warranted? 4 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS 707, 714 (1991).
133
See the Skype website, available at http://www.skype.com/.
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We have already seen that inconsistent implementation of protective
measures in different U.S. states seems to have inspired certain carriers to
adopt subversive approaches to network deployment. For example, in spite
of political maneuvers undertaken to facilitate network construction,134
vocal community protest induced companies like Omnipoint to try to build
several hundred “stealth-antenna” sites without municipal authorization
during the 1990s.135 In this particular case, Omnipoint may have concluded
that the time and expense required to obtain authorization for the antennas,
along with the ensuing public outcry, would have prevented it from
competing successfully with existing providers who had erected antenna
sites years prior. Such “stealth” deployment of wireless sites is not unlike
the phenomenon that we are now experiencing with respect to new
companies (like Skype) that are selling application-level software for people
to run on their PCs. Before we know it, everyone’s computer will be
outfitted with not one but several mechanisms that enable voice
communications. In the end, an industry-coordinated effort to certify these
types of products may help to make the “stealth” and lesser-known
solutions less attractive to consumers.
C. Government Must Respond by Encouraging Self-Regulation
More and more VoIP products are deployed each day, and we will
also have to address the certification and associated liability issues that
inevitably will arise. We believe that the concerted effort of various parties
(e.g., academics, consumers, governments, and non-governmental
organizations) will be required to ensure that the growth and deployment of
VoIP occur in a sensible way that protects consumers by allowing them
access to emergency services. Moreover, even though the effort will need
to be coordinated by these various stakeholders, industry must leap to the
134
See House Report 104-204 at 95 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.A.N.N. 10, 61-62. The report reveals
Congress’s intent to achieve national uniformity over radio frequency emissions standards and notes the interplay
between these standards and local zoning laws:
The [Commerce] Committee has received substantial evidence that local zoning decisions, while
responsive to local concern about the potential effects of radio frequency emission levels, are at
times not supported by scientific and medical evidence. A high quality national wireless
telecommunications network cannot exist if each of its component [sic] must meet different RF
[radio frequency] standards in each community. The Committee believes the [FCC] rulemaking
on this issue (ET Docket 93-62) should contain adequate, appropriate and necessary levels of
protection to the public, and needs to be completed expeditiously.
135
See John Cichowski, Antenna Critics Demand Answers, THE RECORD [Bergen County, NJ], September 4,
1997, at L3. Cichowski discusses Omnipoint’s arrangement with the State of New Jersey to put up 122 sites
without municipal approval. Because of political pressure, the New Jersey Governor stepped in to provide the
municipalities with a veto right. The article also discusses Omnipoint’s “stealth” erection of these sites in a
commercial zone without first obtaining zoning approval. Leslie Haggin, Complaints Force Down Cell Phone
Antenna, THE RECORD [Bergen County, NJ], May 9, 1997. Haggin discusses an Omnipoint cellular phone antenna
that was erected on the side of the Newark Pompton Turnpike without any zoning approval. Municipal authorities
forced the antenna to be taken down.
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forefront of this initiative. Along these lines, the government will have to
abandon its attempts to control development—particularly in cases where
development cannot be controlled—and encourage industry to collaborate
in a self-regulatory effort.
As we have already seen, the government has relaxed antitrust
regulation to allow industry consortia to conduct joint research and
development (through the NCRA). This trend must continue. In the words
of science writer Robert Pool,
[f]or better or worse, technology has changed. Our days of
innocence, when machines were solely a product of largerthan-life inventors and hardworking engineers, are gone.
Increasingly, technology will be a joint effort, with its design
shaped not only by engineers and executives but also
psychologists, political scientists, management theorists, risk
specialists, regulators and courts, and the general public. It
will not be a neat system. It is probably not the best system.
But, given the power and complexity of modern technology,
it is likely our only choice.136
Pool encourages us to embrace the future development of technologies and
to increase our awareness of the roles and impact of these technologies. As
he notes, the “power and complexity of modern technology” warrant
implementation of a proactive, multidisciplinary, cooperative approach that
addresses the challenges of our increasingly technological world.
Of course, the idea that Robert Pool’s “joint [product development]
effort” is really our “only choice” might be challenged by some skeptics.
However, the concept is a useful construct for the fast-changing technology
sector, particularly in areas—like VoIP—where government regulation has
proven that it has difficulty in keeping up with progress.
D. An Ounce of Precaution Is Better Than a Pound of Precaution,
Particularly When the Opportunity Is Lost
We have previously seen that the development of emergency
services and wireless technologies can be analogized to the development of
VoIP. Europeans, for example, have attempted to apply the precautionary
principle in wireless deployments. Accordingly, for our purposes it might
136
ROBERT POOL, BEYOND ENGINEERING: HOW SOCIETY SHAPES TECHNOLOGY (Oxford University Press,
1997), at 305.
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be useful to briefly explore the possible application of this principle in E911
and VoIP deployments and then dismiss that same possibility (much like
Justice Cardozo did when he ruled that individuals may need to stop and
look but that they do not need to reconnoiter).
The precautionary principle is a powerful—but extreme—example
of governments’ constant struggle between encouraging the development of
new and exciting technologies and exerting control over those technologies
so as to protect the citizenry. In attempting to define the precautionary
principle and bring form to its manifold vague shapes, many scholars have
traced the roots of the principle to German law—the Vorsorgeprinzip137—
particularly in connection with environmental policy.138
The
Vorsorgeprinzip origins of the precautionary principle are based on the
rationale that, as Konrad von Moltke notes, “[e]nvironmental policy is not
fully accomplished by warding off imminent hazards and the elimination of
damage which has occurred. Precautionary environmental policy requires
furthermore that natural resources are protected and demands on them are
made with care.”139 The precautionary principle finds its natural home in
environmental law,140 but its exact meaning and the manner in which it
should be applied elsewhere—such as to various aspects of telephony
regulation—are subjects of great debate and controversy.141

137
Vorsorgeprinzip, translated literally, means “foresight principle” or “forecaring principle.” A typically
vague clarification of what the precautionary principle means can be found in an article written by Nicola Notaro,
Environmental Policy, in GABRIEL GLÖCKNER, ET. AL, GUIDE TO EU POLICIES (Bruges: 1998), at 229
[hereinafter: Notaro, Environmental Policy]. The author notes that the precautionary principle is part of European
law and draws a connection between the principle and the Vorsorgeprinzip, though he stops short of any
meaningful discussion of its meaning. His entire discussion of the precautionary principle is as follows:
[The] precautionary principle was added to the [Treaty of the European Union] and stems from
German environmental law where it is known as the Vorsorgeprinzip. The principle is that
whenever there is a strong suspicion that a certain activity may have environmentally harmful
consequences, it is better to act before the damage occurs rather than wait for incontrovertible
scientific evidence.
138
See Katherine Barrett & Joel Tickner, Trans-Atlantic Consumer Dialogue Briefing Paper on the
Precautionary Principle, Working Paper of the University of Massachusetts Lowell Center for Sustainable
Production, April 23, 2001. The authors discuss the origins of the Vorsorgeprinzip, associating it with the modern
precautionary principle, and attribute its origins to a West German movement during the early 1970s. The authors
emphasize, however, that the meaning of the term has changed since the 1970s: “It is critical to note that the
Germans viewed Vorsorge as a means of stimulating innovation and social planning for sustainability, rather than
simply a tool to block potentially dangerous activities.” Id., at 1.
139
Konrad von Moltke, The Vorsorgeprinzip in West German Environmental Policy, in TWELFTH REPORT:
BEST PRACTICAL CONTROL OPTIONS (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1988), at 3.
140
See Notaro, Environmental Policy, cited supra at note 137 (discussing the precautionary principle in the
context of European environmental policy).
141
See e.g., Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L REV. 1003 (2003)
[hereinafter: Sunstein, Precautionary Principle]. Professor Sunstein is a heavy critic of the principle. Sunstein
“challenge[s] the precautionary principle here, not because it leads in bad directions, but because, read for all that
it is worth, it leads in no direction at all. The principle threatens to be paralyzing, forbidding regulation, inaction,
and every step in between.”

3-May-05]

E911: A CERTIFICATION PROPOSAL

45

Scholars have invested great time and energy in investigating the
origins of the precautionary principle and its application to science.142
While it is correct to credit Germany with the principle’s metamorphosis
into a legal norm, it is perhaps more useful to recognize the principle’s
more general derivation. Simply put, the precautionary principle is—at
best—just a principle. Thus, the principle is not law, even if it is mentioned
in the Treaty for the European Union and other international laws in the
United States, Germany, and elsewhere.143 Kenneth Foster, for one, has
examined the precautionary principle as it specifically applies (or could
apply) to mobile phones. Foster, an international expert on the effects of
wireless signals on human safety, has reached the following conclusions:
The Precautionary Principle is not a scientific proposition,
nor is it a precisely defined proposition in international law;
there is some question whether it even qualifies as being a
“principle” at all. Rather, it is a counsel for risk aversion,
expressed in varying ways in numerous treaties and other
documents. In practice, its application is constrained by
policies, statutes and case law of individual states and
international law.144
Indeed, as Foster has suggested, the precautionary principle is no more than
“counsel for risk aversion,” the kind that can be found both in our legal
systems and in everyday aphorisms (e.g., “better safe than sorry”). So,
while it may be helpful for lawyers to take note of the German movement
that incorporated the Vorsorgeprinzip into environmental law in the 1970s
and 1980s, it is somewhat shortsighted to draw wide-ranging conclusions
from the German movement.
Thus, though we have gained a greater understanding of the origins
of the precautionary principle, we are nonetheless left with the following
questions: Should precautions, or, more specifically, the precautionary
principle, be applied to mobile phone safety? To Internet telephony? The
answer to these questions—deceptively—is both yes and no. As might be
expected, the general confusion as to how to apply the principle only
142

Id. (noting the German origins of the precautionary principle).
See e.g., the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, September 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1550, 1551 (applying the precautionary principle by treaty to the ozone layer); UNECD Text on Protection
of Oceans, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sessions, UN Coc. A/CONF.151/PC/100/Add.21 (1991) (applying the precautionary
principle by international treaty to the coast); and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, January 29, 2000, 29 I.L.M. 1027, 1031 (2000) (applying the precautionary principle
generally to living organisms).
144
Kenneth R. Foster, “Can Electromagnetic Fields Trigger the Precautionary Principle?” Presentation at the
WHO/NIEHS/EC Conference on the Precautionary Principle, Luxembourg, February 2003, at 2 (emphasis
added).
143
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increases when it is applied within the context of telephony and the different
technologies associated with it.145 Naturally, we should be cautious, even
precautious, about products on the marketplace.
However, the
precautionary principle should not be applied as a matter of law, if for no
other reason than the fact that it is not law. Accordingly, as we turn to our
proposed model for regulation, we wish to emphasize that the unfortunate
alternative to a self-regulatory certification process may be the largely
unproductive ex post application of precaution through some form of the
precautionary principle.
V. A PROPOSED MODEL
In this section, we will present a specific institutional framework
and a set of summary technical criteria and procedure recommendations in
order to provide a concrete model of a capability for emergency services
self-regulation and certification. We recognize that other models could be
developed.
However, this proposed model represents our best
recommendation based on our current information and understanding.
A. Institutional Design
Here we refine the general observations of Section III into the
following recommendation:
Government agencies should perform some initial coordination
between federal and state levels and then publicize a consistent
and credible statement of intent to regulate VoIP emergency
services unless credible self-regulation emerges. At the same
time, government agencies should move to facilitate successful
self-regulation, as described below.
1. Industry Should Organize
Industry service and equipment providers should form an
organization to pursue VoIP emergency services. Such an organization
could be a derivative of an existing industry trade association or
consortium, and it should have the following characteristics: (1) It should
be funded by and heavily involve industry participants, (2) it should remain
intentionally open and transparent to all industry participants and other
stakeholders, particularly regulators and consumer interest groups (such
arrangements should be codified in the organization’s bylaws), and (3) it
145

See Burgess, A Precautionary Tale, cited supra at note 122, at 15.
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should develop standards, as well as update and extend them. Traditional
open standards bodies such as IETF, the ISO, and the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) can serve as models. Although the body would
initially focus on emergency services, it could eventually embrace other
social policy self-regulation goals as well.146 This organization should also
do the following: create a brand around the certification, establish the
appropriate legal protections, act as a co-sponsor with the government to
promote public awareness of the certification, maintain a database of
accreditations, and police accreditations. The standardization activity
would draw on the momentum built by the Voice on the Net (VON)
Coalition, an alliance between NENA and several VoIP industry
participants. The VON Coalition is described in more detail on the
following pages.
2. A Separation of Powers Should Be Established
While organizing industry into consortia for appropriate standardssetting efforts is a great start, we believe an additional step is needed. In
particular, the process should not be held captive to the interests of certified
parties. Concretely, we recommend implementation of two specific
“separation of power” elements in order to enhance the credibility of the
process. First, multiple independent and competitive testing organizations
should perform accreditation. Furthermore, either these organizations or
third parties should provide pre-certification consulting and training.
Second, these testing organizations should be accredited by a third party,
distinct from both the standards-setting and certification branding
organization and from the testing organizations. The two major candidates
for this role are a government agency and an independent institution (e.g., a
respected neutral institution such as ANSI).
3. Industry and Government Should Work Hand in Hand
In order to facilitate these ends, government agencies should appoint
personnel to assist in the formation of the self-regulation process as follows:
•

Credibly transmit the threat of government regulation if selfregulation fails.

146
We would not expect the motivation for new social policy goals to arise naturally from the industry
participants in this organization. As we have indicated elsewhere, an external motivation is needed. Most likely,
such a motivation would come in the form of a public debate culminating in a credible threat of government
intervention. The close coordination with government that we are proposing could facilitate the efficient signaling
of such events.
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•

Report back to the government the level of progress made.

•

Ensure agency experts provide input into certification standards and
process design.

•

Promote self-regulation elsewhere in government by recognizing
self-regulatory efforts as mitigating factors in punitive proceedings.

•

Educate users about certification (both industry and government
should cosponsor this goal).

•

Work with the telecommunications industry in order to incorporate
the insurance industry in the process and clarify the level of liability
mitigation (beyond government liability mitigation) provided to
those who diligently certify products.

•

Liaise with other interested government parties (e.g., Congress).

Although the preceding responsibilities will require significant
effort, their implementation will require dramatically less effort than that
required to create and execute government command-and-control
regulation. That said, it should be clear that we are by no means advocating
a passive government role.
B. Technical Approach
Ideally, this transition to an IP-based emergency services solution
should not burden future models with legacy assumptions. The design,
function, and operation of the Internet provide an abundant set of possible
solutions, and policy addressing future emergency services should embrace
this flexibility and optimize the potential social benefits. The policy thus
(1) should not restrict the manner in which a function is provided,
(2) should support multiple implementation methods, (3) should encourage
the incorporation of emergency services into other technologies, and
(4) should encourage developers to create cheaper, better, and more featurerich technologies.
Certification will likely need to include both certification of
terminals (which can potentially be transported to a test site) and
certification of network characteristics (which cannot). In this paper, we
focus only on the former, mainly because it is difficult, if not impossible, to
exhaustively test all network nodes and usage combinations as a part of
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certification. With these thoughts in mind, we suggest that network testing
use a meta-standard style process certification focused on (1) the way in
which the network is designed and managed to maintain an emergency
services capability and (2) random performance testing of particular nodes
and situations.
We expect that the diversity of possible VoIP systems will preclude
the possibility of certification to a single level of performance. We also
believe that this diversity should be encouraged. Consequently, we propose
that different levels of capability be certified, keeping in mind that the
number of levels needs to be small enough that consumers can distinguish
them. VoIP systems might, for example, have two certification levels: a
carrier grade level (with significant requirements) and a non-carrier grade
level (with less strenuous requirements).
As part of our proposed implementation plan, we recommend the
use of the stages suggested in the NENA/VON Coalition initial agreement
on VoIP emergency services.147 These stages, or phases, are as follows:
•

Phase One Certification (based on the NENA/VON Coalition
“interim solution”)
—Deliver a 911 call through the existing 911 network
—Provide a callback number to PSAP
—Provide initial location information to PSAP (optional)

•

Phase Two Certification (based on the NENA/VON Coalition “longterm solution”)
—Deliver a 911 call through an IP network to an IP-connected
PSAP (or through an existing 911 network if PSAP is not IPconnected)
—Provide a callback number/recontact information to PSAP
—Provide caller location information to PSAP

This phased approach enables near-immediate implementation of
emergency services. It also encourages a move away from traditional
emergency services toward a more competitive environment.

147
The VON Coalition Initial Agreement, December 2003, available at http://www.nena9-11.org/VoIP_IP/VOIP-NENA%20Actual%20Agreement.pdf. Note that this agreement was reached by the
following industry participants: 8x8, AT&T Consumer Services, BroadSoft, Dialpad, ITXC, Level 3
Communications LLC, Level 3 Enhanced Services, PointOne, pulver.com, VON Coalition, Vonage, and Webley.
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C. Labeling
Throughout this paper, we have noted that labeling could be an
important aspect of the certification process. While the details of such a
mechanism warrant a separate analysis, here we briefly propose a labeling
initiative, discuss its merits, and provide suggestions regarding the manner
in which it might be used.
We envision that labeling might include such concrete (and diverse)
elements as (1) an identifiable sticker attached to IP phones showing the
name of the certifying organization and the address of a website that
provides certification details and updates, (2) a software window that
periodically reminds users of emergency services specifications (possibly
when the device or software detects some configuration change), and/or
(3) an email sent to the user when the network detects a change in its
configuration.
By tying the operation of the label to system changes, the label
becomes a dynamic mechanism that could become very useful in situations
when the network and the device cannot automate the proper operation of
the emergency services system (i.e., when a user might need to intervene).
Lastly, considering the litigious nature of our society, labeling likely
provides some legal protection to the VoIP service or software provider.
In sum, labeling could be used to provide users with information
about the (1) availability or lack of emergency services support,
(2) emergency services limitations, (3) configuration requirements,
(4) configuration changes, and (5) alternative methods of summoning help.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the telecommunications industry has proven adept at selfregulating in areas of interoperability, social policy regulation has
historically been the purview of the government. The diversity engendered
through the transition to VoIP will challenge such command-and-control
regulatory policies, and we believe the time has come to consider the
alternative of social policy self-regulation. We recognize the key challenges
that arise from a self-regulatory process, but we believe that the framework
we have recommended can succeed. Success in this area would not only
provide substantial value in the case of VoIP emergency services, but it
would also add a vital new regulatory approach for use within the
telecommunications industry, which continues to evolve rapidly.
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VoIP technology enables a much broader range of technical and
business approaches than were feasible in the PSTN world. On the one
hand, this new technical reality heralds a new era of innovation and
flexibility for users, while on the other hand it makes difficult (or, more
likely, impossible) the task of mapping traditional social policy goals and
constructs from the PSTN world to the VoIP world in a straightforward
manner. We will want to preserve many current social policy goals in one
form or another, as well as consider new policy goals over time. With these
thoughts in mind, it seems we would be well-served by a more flexible,
rapid, and innovative method of mapping such goals onto the increasingly
heterogeneous world of telecommunications.
Emergency services are a critically important and immediate case in
point. Traditional emergency services expectations include connection of
timely, highly intelligible emergency calls with the appropriate answering
point and communication of critical information regarding the call’s place
of origin (both as a network address and as a physical location). The variety
of VoIP implementations makes these expectations intrinsically difficult to
meet. Thus, we propose that industry should design—using input from the
government and other stakeholders—a multi-tier certification scheme that
will provide a VoIP emergency services capability that can fully satisfy
these expectations. We expect the certification regime to focus on several
key technical characteristics of VoIP systems, including addressing, routing,
location, security, availability, and related network and application
standards.
Our analysis is not complete in some important respects. From the
technology perspective, we would like to further develop a broad set of
technology categories that might be based on media type, network access,
user expectations, or some other criteria. Within these categories, we would
define a set of characteristics upon which a certification process could be
applied (as we have done above for VoIP). While we have performed some
basic legal analysis and inquiry into the role of standardization and
consortia in institutional design, we believe that more research is needed in
this area. We have not considered, for example, how social policy funding
will be affected by the transition to VoIP (e.g., telecommunications industry
taxation helps to fund public safety, and it will be important to determine if
these obligations will be transferred to VoIP or if they will be covered in
some other way). Finally, we briefly discussed the importance of
developing different categories of VoIP implementations against which
different certification standards might be developed. We believe further
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investigation could allow this approach to expand to include other types of
media over IP (e.g., instant messages and video).
Finally, our proposed model needs both refinement and assessment. For
our part, we have evaluated the model by performing critical and
documented analysis of internal integrity and credibility with respect to
successful precedents and by disseminating this analysis to policy-oriented
audiences for critique and debate (as we have done with our submission of a
preliminary version of this paper to the Telecommunications Policy
Research Conference.)148 Moreover, we have used the analysis from
sections II and III to demonstrate the validity of our approach. For the
longer term, we derived this analysis through the use of our particular
model, as well as through our execution of specific strategies for assessing
that model once it is implemented. As part of our strategy, we (1)
monitored elements that evolved beyond the scope of our technical and
business model, (2) tracked specific performance metrics of certified
processes and compared that data against criteria derived from consumer
expectations and social policy goals, and (3) compared voluntary adoption
rates of certification against a template derived from our experience in
industry-sponsored certification processes. This longer-term assessment
represents an ongoing effort that can benefit greatly from reader feedback.
To that end, we welcome comments.

148

See www.tprc.org.

